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Abstract
Industrial organization deals with how seller concentration, product differentiation, and
conditions of entry affect firms’ behavior and market perform. In particular, the U.S. fluid
milk industry is characterized by concentration. As a result of mergers and acquisitions
among fluid milk processors in the late 1990s, the national four-firm concentration ratio
grew faster than any other food processing sector and it accounted for approximately 45%
in the late 2000s. The U.S. fluid milk industry is also marked by co-operative associations.
Marketing co-operatives might play a role in counterbalancing the processor’s buyer power.
In addition to concentration, an organic label is considered a key strategy for differentiating
products in the fluid milk industry. As consumers are willing to pay a premium for the organic
attribute, organic labels are commonly considered a profitable marketing strategy in the fluid
milk industry. These two key features of the U.S. fluid milk industry, 1) concentration in
milk processing and the existence of co-cooperatives and 2) a way of product differentiation,
organic labeling, have led to using an empirical industrial organization approach to study
these two issues in U.S. fluid milk industry.
The first essay examines the role of upstream and downstream market power in deter-
mining the effect of potential supply shocks on price transmission. To do this, I develop
a conceptual framework, which extends Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2006)’s model of suc-
cessive oligopoly, to illustrate the effect of supply shocks on price accounting for 1) market
power and 2) sequential vertical-pricing games. A structural econometric model is employed
to estimate demand, downstream and upstream firms supply and market power parameters
which are derived from the conceptual model. Using the estimated parameters, I simulate
how market power impacts the effect of supply shocks on prices. The conceptual frame-
work shows the following propositions. First, the effect of a negative supply shock on the
change in output price is diminished by the degree of its’ market power. The effect of up-
stream firms’ market power on the change in upstream firms’ output price is larger than
that of downstream firms’ market power on the change in downstream firms’ output price.
Second, the effect of a negative supply shock on the change in downstream firms’ output
price is diminished by the degree of upstream firms’ market power. Third, the impact of
downstream firms’ market power on the change in upstream firms’ output price caused by
a negative supply shock is ambiguous. Fourth, the effect of a negative supply shock on
the change in upstream firms’ output is larger than on the downstream firms’ output price.
The empirical framework suggests that the assumption of perfect competition for upstream
and downstream firms in the U.S. fluid milk industry is rejected. The simulation analysis
indicates that perfect competition assumption overestimates the effect of supply shocks on
both upstream and downstream firms’ output prices. Thus, it is important to account for
the presence of market power when considering the impacts of supply shocks.
In the second essay, I investigate new econometric evidence on the economic value of or-
ganic labels in the fluid milk market from a producer’s standpoint. To do this, a structural
econometric model is used to estimate organic and conventional milk demand. Given the
demand estimates, I simulate two counterfactual analyses in which 1) organic milk products
are replaced by conventional milk products and 2) organic milk producers go out of business
by 1) removing organic attributes from both consumer utility and marginal costs and 2) re-
moving organic brands from the choice set. The demand estimates show that consumers are
willing to pay a significant premium for organic milk products. Consumers’ willingness to
pay for the organic label is $2.47 per half gallon of milk. The counterfactual analyses suggest
that the presence of organic label increases market share and producer surplus for organic
milk brands by approximately 33 (when removing organic attributes) to 100% (when remov-
ing organic brands) while it decreases market share and producer surplus for conventional
brands. Also, the impact on price, share, and producer surplus for conventional brands are
greater when removing organic products from the choice set compared to removing organic
attributes.
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Abstract
Industrial organization deals with how seller concentration, product differentiation, and
conditions of entry affect firms’ behavior and market perform. In particular, the U.S. fluid
milk industry is characterized by concentration. As a result of mergers and acquisitions
among fluid milk processors in the late 1990s, the national four-firm concentration ratio
grew faster than any other food processing sector and it accounted for approximately 45%
in the late 2000s. The U.S. fluid milk industry is also marked by co-operative associations.
Marketing co-operatives might play a role in counterbalancing the processor’s buyer power.
In addition to concentration, an organic label is considered a key strategy for differentiating
products in the fluid milk industry. As consumers are willing to pay a premium for the organic
attribute, organic labels are commonly considered a profitable marketing strategy in the fluid
milk industry. These two key features of the U.S. fluid milk industry, 1) concentration in
milk processing and the existence of co-cooperatives and 2) a way of product differentiation,
organic labeling, have led to using an empirical industrial organization approach to study
these two issues in U.S. fluid milk industry.
The first essay examines the role of upstream and downstream market power in deter-
mining the effect of potential supply shocks on price transmission. To do this, I develop
a conceptual framework, which extends Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2006)’s model of suc-
cessive oligopoly, to illustrate the effect of supply shocks on price accounting for 1) market
power and 2) sequential vertical-pricing games. A structural econometric model is employed
to estimate demand, downstream and upstream firms supply and market power parameters
which are derived from the conceptual model. Using the estimated parameters, I simulate
how market power impacts the effect of supply shocks on prices. The conceptual frame-
work shows the following propositions. First, the effect of a negative supply shock on the
change in output price is diminished by the degree of its’ market power. The effect of up-
stream firms’ market power on the change in upstream firms’ output price is larger than
that of downstream firms’ market power on the change in downstream firms’ output price.
Second, the effect of a negative supply shock on the change in downstream firms’ output
price is diminished by the degree of upstream firms’ market power. Third, the impact of
downstream firms’ market power on the change in upstream firms’ output price caused by
a negative supply shock is ambiguous. Fourth, the effect of a negative supply shock on
the change in upstream firms’ output is larger than on the downstream firms’ output price.
The empirical framework suggests that the assumption of perfect competition for upstream
and downstream firms in the U.S. fluid milk industry is rejected. The simulation analysis
indicates that perfect competition assumption overestimates the effect of supply shocks on
both upstream and downstream firms’ output prices. Thus, it is important to account for
the presence of market power when considering the impacts of supply shocks.
In the second essay, I investigate new econometric evidence on the economic value of or-
ganic labels in the fluid milk market from a producer’s standpoint. To do this, a structural
econometric model is used to estimate organic and conventional milk demand. Given the
demand estimates, I simulate two counterfactual analyses in which 1) organic milk products
are replaced by conventional milk products and 2) organic milk producers go out of business
by 1) removing organic attributes from both consumer utility and marginal costs and 2) re-
moving organic brands from the choice set. The demand estimates show that consumers are
willing to pay a significant premium for organic milk products. Consumers’ willingness to
pay for the organic label is $2.47 per half gallon of milk. The counterfactual analyses suggest
that the presence of organic label increases market share and producer surplus for organic
milk brands by approximately 33 (when removing organic attributes) to 100% (when remov-
ing organic brands) while it decreases market share and producer surplus for conventional
brands. Also, the impact on price, share, and producer surplus for conventional brands are
greater when removing organic products from the choice set compared to removing organic
attributes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Market structure and competition have long been the main topics in the field of industrial
organization as they affect both price and output determination. There is a general belief
among economists that seller concentration, product differentiation, and conditions of entry
may affect market structure and competition. Seller concentration refers to a measure of the
number of firms and their shares of the total production in a market. Product differentiation
is the process of distinguishing a product from others. The conditions of entry refer to the
ease with which new firms can enter a market. Industrial organization deals with how seller
concentration, product differentiation, and conditions of entry affect firms’ behavior and
market perform. In addition, industrial organization also attempts to identify factors that
influence seller concentration, degree of product differentiation, and conditions of entry.
The U.S. fluid milk industry is characterized by concentration. Figure 1.1 presents num-
bers of milk processors and concentration ratios for the fluid milk industry between 1992-
2007. The four-firm concentration ratio for fluid milk has been relatively low compared to
other food processing industries up to the late 1990s. However, several merges and acqui-
sitions that occurred in the early 2000s led to higher market concentration for fluid milk
processors. For instance, the two largest private fluid processing firms, Dean Foods and
Suize Foods, merged in December 2001. In July 2002, Dean Foods purchased Land O’Lakes
Inc.’s upper Midwest fluid milk operations and then acquired Horizon Organic Holding Cor-
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poration in 2004. Table 1.1 presents the top 10 largest dairy processors and manufacturers
by the number of plants operated. As a result of mergers and acquisitions, between 1997 to
2004, the national four-firm concentration ratio grew faster than any other food processing
sector and it accounted for approximately 45%.
The U.S. fluid milk industry is also marked by co-operative associations. In 1922, the
Capper-Volstead Act gave co-operatives producing agricultural products certain exemptions
from antitrust laws. It allowed dairy farmers to band together and help negotiate with
milk processors using collective bargaining. The existence of marketing co-operatives makes
agricultural markets distinguishable from other markets. Rogers and Sexton (1994) argue
that “marketing co-operatives or bargaining associations, institutions of seller power, are
present or potentially present in the market” (p. 1143). Marketing co-operatives might play
a role in counterbalancing the processor’s buyer power.
There has been the trend toward increasing consolidation among dairy co-operatives as
several dairy co-operatives have merged since the 1940s. The number of co-operatives had
declined to 155 in 2007 while the number of co-operatives was over 2,300 in the 1940s.
Increasing concentration in dairy co-operatives has enabled them to have an improved bar-
gaining position against milk handlers. Table 1.2 presents, in 2008, the United States’ top
10 and 50 milk co-operatives (by volume) marketed about 48% and 79% of all fluid milk,
respectively.
In addition to concentration, an organic label is considered a key strategy for differen-
tiating products in the fluid milk industry. Sales of organic products in the United States
were estimated at $35 billion in 2014. After fresh fruits and vegetables (43 percent), dairy
has been the second top selling category of organically grown food in 2012, followed by pack-
aged/prepared foods (11 percent), beverages (11 percent), bread/grains (9 percent), snack
foods (5 percent), meat/fish/poultry (3 percent), and condiments (3 percent) (USDA, 2017).
Organic labels are commonly considered a profitable marketing strategy in the fluid milk in-
dustry as producers use organic labels as a way of distinguishing and creating a unique brand
for their products (Messer et al., 2015). These arguments could be supported by the fact
that consumers are willing to pay a premium for organic attributes (Bernard and Bernard,
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2009; Bonnet and Bouamra-Mechemache, 2015; Brooks and Lusk, 2010; Dhar and Foltz,
2005; Kanter et al., 2009; Kiesel and Villas-Boas, 2007; Wolf et al., 2011).
Due to these two key features of the U.S. fluid milk industry; 1) concentration in milk
processing and the existence of co-cooperatives and 2) organic labeling, I use empirical
industrial organization to study several issues in U.S. fluid milk industry. There have been
few studies to investigate the economic implications of upstream and downstream firms’
market power on price transmission and organic labeling from a producers’ standpoint in
the fluid milk market. For example, what is the role of upstream and downstream market
power in determining the effect of potential supply shocks on price transmission? Does the
organic label lead to higher sales? For this dissertation, these questions will be addressed.
In Chapter 2, I aim to examine the role of upstream and downstream market power in
determining the effect of supply shocks on price transmission. The analysis is composed of
three sections: theoretical, empirical, and simulation study.
In the theoretical section, I develop a conceptual framework that extends Villas-Boas and
Hellerstein (2006) to account for 1) market power and 2) sequential vertical-pricing games
between upstream and downstream firms. The equilibrium upstream and downstream firms’
output price is derived as a function of supply shocks by substituting the equilibrium quantity
into the demand and derived demand function. It shows that the effect of supply shocks on
the equilibrium upstream and downstream firms’ output price is a function of downstream
and upstream market power. The comparative static and comparative static derivative of
these effects with respect to the market power parameters leads to four propositions. A key
proposition of this paper is the effect of a negative supply shock on the change in output
price is diminished by the degree of its’ market power.
In the empirical section, the inverse demand equation is estimated along with the down-
stream firms’ supply relation and upstream firms’ supply relation to identify demand, cost,
and market power parameters. Time-series data on the price and quantity of U.S. fluid milk
from January 2005 to December 2014 are used. The market power parameters show that
they are consistent with symmetric Cournot behavior in the case of ten firms and four to
ten firms for downstream and upstream firms, respectively.
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In the simulation section, simulations at successive vertical stages are conducted given
the estimates from the empirical study under two market power scenarios: 1) symmetric
Cournot and 2) perfect competition. Consistent with the theoretical findings, I find that
perfect competition always overestimates the impact of supply shocks on prices than a given
degree of market power.
Chapter 3 attempts to quantify the economic value of the organic label from a producer’s
standpoint. This analysis consists of three sections: demand, supply, and a counterfactual
analysis.
In the demand analysis, a structural econometric model of organic and conventional
milk demand is estimated using weekly retail prices, aggregate market shares, and product
characteristics. These data are aggregated by brand and week. Consistent with previous
studies, I find that consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for organic milk
products. Consumers willingness to pay for organic labeling is $2.47 per gallon of milk. The
deviation from the mean utility suggest that consumers’ preference for price, 2% milkfat,
plastic package, and organic are likely to be heterogeneous across consumers.
In the supply analysis, price-cost margins are computed based on the demand estimate.
Given observed retail prices, marginal costs are recovered and regressed on the estimated
marginal costs on the observable product characteristics. The average price-cost margins
across products account for 38.32% of the retail price. I also find that producing organic
increases the marginal costs by $1.60 per gallon.
In the counterfactual scenarios, the following questions are addressed: What would hap-
pen if organic milk products are 1) replaced by conventional milk products or 2) are removed
from the market? To answer these questions, two counterfactual analyses are investigated by
1) removing the organic attribute from consumer utility and marginal costs and 2) removing
organic brands. The results show that the presence of organic labeling increases market
share and producer surplus for organic milk brands by approximately 33 (when removing or-
ganic attributes) to 100% (when removing organic brands). Also, organic labeling decreases
market shares and producer surplus for conventional brands. The impact on price, share,
and producer surplus for conventional brands are greater when removing organic products
4
from the market compared to removing the organic attribute.
In Chapter 4, the key findings and contributions from the two studies are summarized.
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Table 1.1: Top 10 U.S. Dairy Processors by Volume in 2008
Rank Company Sales ($ million) Number of Plants
1 Dean Foods Co. 12,454 81
2 Kraft Foods North America Inc. 4,800 16
3 Saputo Inc. 4,390 45
4 Land O’ Lake Inc. 4,136 9
5 Schreiber Food Inc. 3,500 18
6 Prairie Farms Dairy 2,924 20
7 Agropur Cooperative 2,800 26
8 Kroger Co. Dairy Operation 2,500 19
9 Leprino Food Co. 2,500 9
10 Darigold Inc. 2,200 11
Source: Dairy Foods, https://www.dairyfoods.com/ext/resources/DF/Home/Files/PDFs/archives/d/df0809Dairy-
100-table.pdf
Table 1.2: Top 10 U.S. Dairy Co-operatives by Volume in 2008
Rank Dairy Co-operative Member milk volume (mil. lbs.) Member farms
1 Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. 37,900 10,178
2 California Dairies, Inc. 17,700 589
3 Land O’Lakes, Inc. 12,706 2,965
4 Norhwest Dairy Association 7,900 532
5 Dairylea Cooperatives, Inc. 5,914 2,264
6 Associated Milk Producers, Inc. 5,800 3,500
7 Family Dairies USA 5,751 3,563
8 Foremost Farms USA 4,990 2,356
9 Manitowoc Milk Producers Cooperative 4,857 2,945
10 Select Milk Producers, Inc. 4,629 79
Total for top 10 co-operatives 90,465 25,412
(48% of U.S.) (37% of U.S.)
Total for top 50 co-operatives 150,699 43,448
(79% of U.S.) (65% of U.S.)
Source: Hoards Dairyman, October 10, 2009, p. 613.
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Chapter 2
Price Transmission and Supply
Shocks: The Role of Upstream and
Downstream Market Power
2.1 Introduction
Supply shocks are common in the food industry for a variety of reasons including animal dis-
eases outbreaks (e.g., foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI)). Negative supply shocks can have considerable economic impacts to the various
stakeholder groups including producers, processors, and the final consumer as highly conta-
gious animal diseases can lead to a dramatic supply reduction, cause increases in farm prices,
and eventually an increase in wholesale and retail prices.
In the past 10 years, several animal disease outbreaks have occurred in many parts of
the world. The 2010-2011 FMD outbreaks in Korea caused significant economic impacts
on livestock production. The number of culled animals were about 3.5 million head with
more than 30% of the swine depopulated. With domestic supplies shrinking due to a mass
hog depopulation, pork price sharply increased by 9.2% (Korea Rural Economic Institute
(KREI), 2011). The 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak in commercial poultry had considerable
8
economic impacts on U.S. poultry industry. More than 48 million birds were affected with
67% being laying hens and the remaining 33% were commercial turkeys. The large HPAI
outbreak in the Midwestern U.S. caused an increase in national egg prices despite a decline
in late 2014 as markets did adjust (Huang et al., 2016).
A growing literature investigates the ex-ante economic consequences of hypothetical an-
imal disease outbreaks. Pendell et al. (2015) and Pendell et al. (2016) evaluate the eco-
nomic consequences of hypothetical FMD and Rift Valley Fever outbreaks, respectively,
from the releases of the viruses in the future National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in
Kansas. Thompson et al. (2019) estimates the economic impacts of business continuity on a
hypothetical HPAI outbreak in the Midwestern United States. These previous studies use a
partial equilibrium model to evaluate market-level impacts.
The partial equilibrium models used in the studies mentioned above utilized a compet-
itive market framework assuming price-taking economic decision-makers. This may not be
appropriate to evaluate the effect of supply shocks on prices when a market is highly con-
centrated. The increasing consolidation of the livestock, meat, and products industry may
influence the effect of supply shocks on prices. Ignoring market power may under or over-
estimate the impact of supply shocks on prices throughout the supply chain. Thus, it is
important to consider market power when measuring the effect of supply shocks on prices.
Several studies have focused efforts on investigating the degree of price transmission in
the light of market power. McCorriston et al. (1998) consider factors (e.g., market power)
which influence the degree of price transmission by deriving a price transmission elastic-
ity. Weldegebriel (2004) develops a model of price transmission where both oligopoly and
oligopsony power co-exist. Bunte and Peerlings (2003) perform simulations to show how
market power could cause asymmetric price adjustments. Lloyd et al. (2006) constructs a
theoretical model to highlight the linkage between market power and price transmission, but
fail to link their theoretical framework with an empirical framework due to the difficulty in
distinguishing market power and returns to scale.
A key difference between this research and previous studies is the use of structural estima-
tion. Many of the previous studies have developed theoretical models of price transmission
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where imperfect competition exists. To quantify the effect of market power on price transmis-
sion, these papers use a simulation framework based on estimates from previous literature.
To the best of our knowledge, the theoretical framework regarding the role of market power
in determining the extent of price transmission has not been directly linked with an empirical
framework. This leads us to the use of structural estimation that allows for linking of the
theoretical framework with an empirical model.
There is a strand of literature that analyzes the effects of market power on a variety of
topics in agricultural marketing literature. Russo et al. (2011) analyze the interaction of
market power and government intervention, and shows that market power may reduce the
net welfare benefits from removing agricultural support policies. Zhang and Sexton (2002)
investigate the effects of downstream market power on optimal commodity promotion and
finds that imperfect competition reduces farmer’s optimal advertising expenditure. Sexton
et al. (2007) study the role of downstream market power in agricultural trade liberalization
and demonstrates that departures from the perfect competition can cause much of the bene-
fits from trade liberalization. Saitone et al. (2008) analyze the effect of market power on the
impacts of the ethanol subsidy. However, little is known about the effect of market power
on prices at successive vertical stages when there are supply shocks.
Our objective is to investigate the role of upstream and downstream market power in
determining the effect of potential supply shocks on price transmission. To do this, we
develop a conceptual framework, which extends Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2006)’s model of
successive oligopoly to illustrate the effect of supply shocks on price accounting for 1) market
power and 2) sequential vertical-pricing games. We also estimate a structural econometric
model to determine demand, downstream and upstream firms supply, and market power
parameters which are derived from the conceptual model. Using the estimated parameters,
we simulate how market power impacts the effect of supply shocks on prices.
The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach has been widely implemented
to assess the degree of market power. We exploit an extension of the traditional NEIO
framework (Villas-Boas and Hellerstein 2006). The model is applied to the production and
marketing of U.S. fluid milk. By the 20th century, dairy farmers had formed co-operatives
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associations to offset fluid milk processors market power. Indeed, the nations top 50 milk
co-operatives marketed about 79% of all farm milk in the United States (2013). Cakir and
Balagtas (2012) adopted Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2006)’s model of successive oligopoly to
estimate oligopoly power of dairy co-operatives and processors-retailers. They find that both
co-operatives and processor-retailer exert market power to raise their prices above marginal
costs by approximately 9% and 1%, respectively.
Our contribution to the literature on the effects of market power is twofold. First, we
develop a structural model to study how upstream and downstream firms’ market power
can affect price transmission. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first study to link
the theoretical framework regarding price transmission and market power with an empirical
framework. Methodologically, our model that estimates the magnitude of price transmission
resulting from a supply shock in the fluid milk markets may also be applied to markets
of other agricultural products. Second, the impact of supply shocks on price transmission,
which is under study in this paper, is an important topic that deserves the attention of
researchers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the main method-
ological contributions on the conceptual framework which enables us to link to an empirical
framework. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the data. Section 2.4 presents the empirical
model and its identification. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results for demand and sup-
ply relation for upstream and downstream firms and Section 2.6 presents simulation results.
Finally, section 2.7 provides conclusions of these paper.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
We consider a flexible model setting to analyze the role of both upstream and downstream
firms in the effect of supply shocks on pricing behavior. Following Cakir and Balagtas (2012),
we assume an integrated producing and processing-retailing sector where the producing
sector, which comprises of dairy farms and co-operatives, produces milk and then sells it to
the processing-retailing sector which performs processing and then sells the products to final
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consumers at retail. We refer to milk producing and processing-retailing sectors as upstream
firms and downstream firms, respectively. Both upstream and downstream firms may exhibit
market power.
In this paper, the linear pricing model is considered, where the upstream firms first
set their output price (pu) and the downstream firms follow by setting their output price
(pd) given the upstream firms prices (pu). Also, we assume that the downstream firms’
quantity (Qd) is equal to the upstream firms’ quantity (Qu) and total quantity (Q) (i.e.,
Q = Qd = Qu).
The inverse demand for the downstream firms is given by
pd = h(Q, Y, δ) (2.1)
where Y represents the variables that shift the demand curve, and δ are parameters to be
estimated.
Profit of the downstream firm i (pii) is
pii = h(Q, Y, δ)qi − puqi − Cd(qi, R, τ) (2.2)
where qi is the output of firm i, C
d is the cost function of a downstream firm, R is the
variables that shifts the cost function of the downstream firms, and τ are the unknown
parameters of the cost function to be estimated.
There exists an identification problem since we have information only on aggregate supply
and are not able to determine the parameters of each firm (e.g., demand, supply, and conduct
parameter). Thus, we determine the average market parameters and then derive the supply
relation for the industry, rather than each firm. The equilibrium in the industry is determined
by the simultaneous solution of n supply relations, demand function, and identity Q =
∑
qi.
We assume marginal costs of both downstream and upstream firms are increasing returns
to scale, which is crucial to identify the conduct parameters. The marginal costs of the
downstream firms, cd, can be expressed as cd = βd + τdQ + γdR where βd, τd and γd are
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parameters to be estimated. Likewise, marginal costs of the upstream firms, cu, are defined
as cu = βu + τuQ + γuW where W represents exogenous variables that affect cost of the
upstream firms and βu, τu and γu are the upstream firms’ costs parameters to be estimated.
We can set the downstream firms’ perceived marginal revenue, pd + λdh
′(Q)Q, equal to
the sum of the upstream firms’ output price, pu, and marginal cost of the downstream firms,
cd, to obtain the downstream firms’ supply relation for the industry
pd = pu − λdh′(Q)Q+ βd + τdQ+ γdR. (2.3)
λd ∈ [0, 1] is the conduct parameter for the downstream firms. If λd = 0, downstream firms
behave as a price taker since equation (2.3) reduces to pd = pu + cd, that is, price equals
to marginal cost. The larger λd, the further away the industry is from perfect competition,
with λd = 1 implying a monopoly.
From equation (2.3), the inverse derived demand faced by the upstream firms is derived
as follows:
pu = h(Q) + λdh
′(Q)Q− βd − τdQ− γdR. (2.4)
Setting the upstream firms’ perceived marginal revenue, pu + λu[h
′(Q)Q + λdh′′(Q)Q2 +
λdh
′(Q)Q], equal to marginal costs of the upstream firms, cu, gives their supply relation:
pu = −λuλd[h′′(Q)Q2 + h′(Q)Q]− λuh′(Q)Q+ βu + τuQ+ γuW (2.5)
where λu ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter which measures the conduct of the upstream firms.
For simplicity, a linear demand function is assumed as follows:
Q = α0 + α1p
d + α2Y (2.6)
which yields h(Q) = −α0
α1
+ 1
α1
Q− α2
α1
Y and h′(Q) = 1
α1
and finally h′′(Q) = 0.
To analyze how equilibrium prices change as the downstream and the upstream firms’
market power change, we need equilibrium quantity and prices. First, we solve for market
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equilibrium quantity to derive the market equilibrium prices. By substituting the inverse
derived demand, equation (2.4), into the perceived marginal revenue equation, (2.5), and
adding a supply shock term, we solve for the equilibrium quantity, Q∗, as follows:
Q∗ = β1[
α0
α1
+
α2Y
α1
+ βu + γuR + βu + γuW + τuX] (2.7)
where β1 =
α1
(1+λu)(1+λd)−α1(τu+τd) and X indicates a (negative) supply shock where X is a
positive number. The detail derivation is illustrated in Appendix A.
If we substitute the equilibrium quantity from equation (2.7) into the linear demand
function in equation (2.6) and rearrange terms, the equilibrium downstream firms’ output
price can be found as follows:1
pd = β2 + β3Y + β4[βu + γuR + βd + γdW ] + β5X (2.8)
where
β2 =
−(λd + λu + λdλu) + α1(τu + τd)
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) (
α0
α1
),
β3 =
−(λd + λu + λdλu) + α1(τu + τd)
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) (
α2
α1
),
β4 =
1
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) , and
β5 =
τu
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) .
The α1 parameter describes how demand for the downstream firms falls as its own price
increase (i.e., it reflects the own-price elasticity of demand). The τu and τd parameters
represent how the marginal costs of producing one more unit of a good for the upstream and
downstream firms, respectively, increases as its supply increases (i.e., it reflects the elasticity
of supply). Since α1 is negative, τu and τd are positive, λu and λd range between 0 to 1,
a negative shock on supply leads to the higher downstream firms’ output price, which is
1The detail derivation is illustrated in Appendix A.
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theoretically plausible.
We also solve for equilibrium upstream firms’ output price. From equation (2.3), the
derived demand faced by the upstream firms can be written as:
Q = β6[
α0
α1
+ pu +
α2Y
α1
+ βd + γdR] (2.9)
where β6 =
α1
(1+λd)−α1τd . Substituting the derived demand faced by the upstream firms in
equation (2.9) into the equilibrium quantity in equation (2.7), the equilibrium upstream
firms’ output price can be derived as:2
pu = β7 + β8Y + β9[βd + γdR] + β10[βu + γuW ] + β11X (2.10)
where
β7 = β2,
β8 = β3,
β9 = β4,
β10 =
(1 + λd)− α1τd
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) , and
β11 =
τu[(1 + λd)− α1τd]
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) .
The comparative static and comparative static derivative of the parameters of interest, β5
and β11, indicates the effect of supply shocks on the change in the equilibrium upstream and
downstream firms’ output price, with respect to the conduct parameters in equations (2.8)
and (2.10). This leads to the four propositions described below.
Proposition 1 . The effect of a negative supply shock on the change in output price is
diminished by the degree of its’ market power. The effect of upstream firms’ market power on
the change in upstream firms’ output price is larger than that of downstream firms’ market
2The detail derivation is illustrated in Appendix A.
15
power on the change in downstream firms’ output price.
Proof:
∂β5
∂λd
=
−τu(1 + λu)
{(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd)}2 < 0
∂β11
∂λu
=
−τu(1 + λu)[(1 + λd)− α1τd)
{(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd)}2 < 0
|∂β5
∂λd
| = τu(1 + λu){(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd)}2 ≤ |
∂β11
∂λu
| = τu(1 + λu)[(1 + λd)− α1τd){(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd)}2
We plot the role of market power in determining the effect of supply shocks on price in Figure
2.1. An industry with more market power faces a steeper downward-sloping marginal revenue
curve (MRM), which means that each additional unit the industry with more market power
sells brings in less revenue when compared to an industry with less market power. In other
words, an industry with more market power has a less elastic marginal revenue curve. As the
marginal revenue curve becomes steeper, the change in equilibrium quantity for the industry
with more market power (∆QM) gets smaller as a result of a supply shock. Therefore, the
magnitude of the change in the output price (∆PM) is smaller when the firms have more
market power.
The intuition behind this result is that firms with market power have the ability to adjust
their output price through markup absorption. Under perfect competitive markets, for ex-
ample, firms pass on the full extent of cost changes to their output price since they set price
equal to marginal costs. On the other hand, under oligopoly markets, firms with market
power do not pass the full extent of cost changes by absorbing their markup to offset a fall
in sales (McCorriston et al. 1998). This theoretical prediction is in line with Bettendorf and
Verboven (2000) and Bonnet et al. (2013) which point out markup absorption is more impor-
tant in oligopolies than competitive markets and that in an oligopoly market, pass-through
will be more incomplete.
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Proposition 2 . The effect of a negative supply shock on the change in downstream
firms’ output price is diminished by the degree of upstream firms’ market power, λu.
Proof:
∂β5
∂λu
=
−τu(1 + λd)
{(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd)}2 < 0
As shown in Proposition 1 , the extent of rising the upstream firms’ output price due to the
supply shock is weakened as upstream firms have more market power. From the standpoint
of the downstream firms, the upstream firms’ output price is considered as the marginal cost
of producing one more unit of a good. As the change in marginal costs for downstream firms
decreases, the change in downstream firms’ output prices is decreasing. In other words, the
degree of shifting the downstream firms’ supply curve upward due to the higher marginal
cost is less when the upstream firms have more market power. Therefore, upstream firms’
market power weakens the effect of the supply shock on downstream firms’ price.
Proposition 3 . The impact of downstream firms’ market power, λd, on the change in
upstream firms’ output price caused by a negative supply shock is ambiguous.
Proof:
∂β11
∂λd
=
τuα1(τdλu − τu)
{(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd)}2 ≶ 0
Downstream firms’ market power affects the change in upstream firms’ output price through
two channels: 1) the change in equilibrium quantity, and 2) the change in the slope of the
derived demand faced by the upstream firms. An increase in downstream firms’ market
power leads to 1) a smaller equilibrium quantity and 2) a steeper derived demand curve.
Downstream firms’ market power may weaken or strengthen depending on the degree of
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changes in 1) the equilibrium quantity and 2) the slope of the derived demand faced by the
upstream firms. If the degree of change in the equilibrium quantity is larger (smaller) than
the slope of derived demand, downstream firms’ market power may decrease (increase) the
change in upstream firms’ output price.
Consider the case where τd = 0. We find that
∂β11
∂λd
is positive, which indicates downstream
firms’ market power strengthens the effect of a supply shock on the upstream firms’ output
price. This result implies that when τd = 0, the change in the slope of the derived demand
curve caused by the increase in downstream firms’ market power is dominant, compared to
the change in equilibrium quantity. When τd is positive, the slope of upstream firms’ supply
curve gets steeper compared to τd = 0. As a result, under the same level of a supply shock,
the change in the upstream firms’ output price gets smaller compared to τd = 0. Therefore,
the impact of downstream firms’ market power on the change in upstream firms’ output
price is ambiguous.
Proposition 4 . The price transmission between upstream firms and downstream firms
is asymmetric. The effect of a negative supply shock on the change in upstream firms’ output
is larger than on the downstream firms’ output price.
Proof:
β5 =
τu
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) ≤ β11 =
τu[(1 + λd)− α1τd]
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd)
As shown in Proposition 1 , downstream firms do not pass the full extent of the cost
changes, increased upstream firms’ output price, to their output price by absorbing their
markup. Thus, the degree of pass-through from a supply shock is larger for the upstream
firms than the downstream firms. This theoretical prediction is consistent with Cramon-
Taubadel (1998) and Bunte and Peerlings (2003) which indicates that farm prices are not
fully transmitted to consumer prices.
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2.3 Data
The data used are aggregated monthly U.S. industry data on prices and quantities of fluid
milk and prices of related products from January 2005 to December 2014. Retail prices, co-
operative prices and the quantity of milk are obtained from the online database maintained
by the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). The retail price is calculated by taking
the average across three types of retail stores: 1) the largest food store chains, 2) the second
largest food store chains, and 3) convenience stores. We use the co-operative class 1 price
as the upstream firms’ price. They are converted to $/lb assuming 1 gallon of fluid milk
weighs 8 lbs. Per capita Real Disposable Income comes from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Monthly averages of retail diesel and electricity prices are collected from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). U.S. monthly dairy costs of production are
collected from USDA’s 2005 (2005 – 2009) and 2010 (2010 – 2014) Agricultural Resource
Management Survey (ARMS) of milk producers. All prices, income, and costs data are
deflated by the consumer price index (January 2005 = 100). U.S. price indices for breakfast
cereal, juices, cheese, coffee and tea, labor are collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of
the U.S. Department of Labor. Labor price is the average hourly production worker earnings
for the fluid milk industry. All indexes are normalized to January 2005 = 100. Table 2.1
provides summary statistics of the data.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
In order to identify demand, cost, and market power parameters, we estimate the inverse
demand equation in equation (2.1), the downstream firms’ supply relation in equation (2.3)
and upstream firms’ supply relation in equation (2.5) using time-series data on the price and
quantity of U.S. fluid milk in each of t = 1, ..., T periods.
The inverse demand for the downstream firms can be specified:
pdt = δ0 + δ1Qt + δ2PJt + δ3PJtQt + δ4It + δ5PBCt + δ6PCTt + δ7PCt + δ8Dt (2.11)
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where Q is quantity of fluid milk, pd is the retail price of fluid milk, PJ is price of juices,
I is per capita income, PBC is price of breakfast cereal, PCT is price of coffee-tea, PC is
price of cheese, and D is a seasonal dummy. Importantly, we interact the price of juices with
quantity to identify the market power parameters. The price of juices shifts the demand
curve through δ2 and it also determines the slope of the demand curve through δ3.
The slope of the demand curve is
∂p
∂Q
= δ1 + δ3PJ. (2.12)
The marginal cost of downstream firms is linear as follows:
cd = βd + τdQt + γ2Wt + γ3DIt + γ4Et + γ5Dt (2.13)
where W is labor price, DI is diesel price, E is electricity price, and D is a seasonal dummy.
Substituting equations (2.12) and (2.13) into the retailers’ supply relation in equation
(2.3), we get
pdt − put = βd + (τd − δ1λd)Qt − (δ3λd)PJtQt + γ2Wt + γ3DIt + γ4Et + γ5Dt. (2.14)
The estimatable econometric equation for equation (2.14) is
pdt − put = τ0 + τ1Qt + τ2PJtQt + τ3Wt + τ4DIt + τ5Et + τ6Dt (2.15)
where τ0 = βd, τ1 = τd − δ1λd, τ2 = −δ3λd, τ3 = γ2, τ4 = γ3, τ5 = γ4 and τ6 = γ5. Therefore,
the estimate of downstream firms’ market power is given by λd = − τ2δ3 , where δ3 comes from
the demand function. In addition, the estimate of downstream firms’ supply parameter,
τd = τ1 + δ1λd, is identified.
The marginal cost of upstream firms is given as:
cu = βu + τuQt + γ6Ft + γ7Lt + γ8ENt + γ9Dt (2.16)
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where F is price of feed, L is price of labor, EN is price of fuel, lube and electricity, and D
is a seasonal dummy.
Substituting equations (2.12) and (2.16) into the upstream supply relation in equation
(2.5), we get
put = βu+{τu−δ1λu(1+λd)}Qt−{δ3λu(1+λd)}PJtQt+γ6Ft+γ7Lt+γ8ENt+γ9Dt (2.17)
Cakir and Balagtas (2012) assume the regulated minimum price for class 1 milk is upstream
firms’ marginal cost of supplying milk to downstream firms, implying upstream firms’ market
power can be measured by their ability to raise prices above the regulated minimum price.
However, market power is defined as the ability to set price profitably above marginal costs
(Perloff et al., 2007). Since the regulated minimum price is greater than marginal costs
for upstream firms and federal order changes take years and not designed to respond to
temporary shift in costs (Sumner, 2018), it may be inappropriate to measure upstream
firms’ market power as their ability to set price above the regulated minimum price. Thus,
instead of the minimum price, we use upstream firms’ marginal costs information to measure
upstream firms’ market power.
The econometric equation for equation (2.17) is
put = σ0 + σ1Qt + σ2PJtQt + σ3Ft + σ4Lt + σ5Ct + σ6ENt + σ6Dt (2.18)
where σ1 = τu − δ1λu(1 + λd), and σ2 = −δ3λu(1 + λd). Therefore, the estimate of upstream
firms’ market power is given by λu = −σ2(1+λd)δ3 , where the estimate of δ3 comes from the
demand function. Additionally, the estimate of upstream firms’ supply parameter, τu =
σ1 + δ1λu(1 + λd) is identified.
Equations (2.11), (2.15) and (2.18) can be consistently estimated using two-stage least
squares (2SLS). After estimating these equations, the parameters in the conceptual frame-
work including the market power parameters (λu and λd), demand parameter (α1), supply
parameters (τd and τu), and cost parameters (β and γ) are identified.
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2.5 Estimation Results
If the unobserved demand-side shock and supply-side shock that are correlated with quan-
tity affect the prices, then the ordinary least square estimates of quantity would be bias
and inconsistent. The exogenous demand and supply shifters are uncorrelated with both
unobserved demand-side and supply-side shocks, but correlated with quantity. Thus, these
exogenous variables are exploited as instruments for quantity.
The demand equation, supply relation for upstream and downstream firms can be con-
sistently estimated using 2SLS, as in Porter (1983) and Agostini (2006).3 This provides the
parameters needed for the simulation analysis in Section 2.6. The results in column (1) of ta-
bles 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 correspond to the model using monthly demand or supply shifters while
the results in column (2) represents the results using quarterly demand or supply shifters.
Table 2.2 provides the results of the demand estimation of equation (2.11). The quan-
tity coefficient have the expected negative sign. However, the coefficient of quantity is not
statistically significant in column (1). The interaction term between the price of juices and
quantity is not statistically significant in column (1) while it is statistically significant in
column (2). The coefficients on income and price of substitutes and complements, juices,
coffee-tea, and cheese are statistically significant in two specifications and, thus, seem to
affect fluid milk demand.
Table 2.3 shows the results of the supply correspondence estimation of downstream firms
in equation (2.15). The coefficient of the co-operative price is positive as expected, ranges be-
tween 0.699 and 0.915. The estimated coefficients for diesel and electricity prices are positive
and statistically significant when using quarter supply shifters. The market power parameter
of the downstream firm, λd, ranges from 0.093 to 0.138, which seems to be consistent with
symmetric Cournot behavior in the case of ten firms. The coefficient of the market power
parameter of the downstream firm is statistically different from zero. The statistically sig-
nificant estimates of quantity in demand equation and supply relation of downstream firms
3The demand equation, supply relation for downstream firms and supply relation for upstream firms
can be jointly estimated using three-stage least square (3SLS), which is relatively efficient. However, the
downside of 3SLS is that misspecification may lead to inconsistent estimators. The advantage of using 2SLS
is that it is robust to misspecification and allows consistency.
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allow to have a statistically significant estimate of quantity on the marginal cost of down-
stream firms, and it ranges from 0.002 to 0.003. This represents a deviation from constant
returns to scale.
Table 2.4 reports the results of the supply correspondence estimation of upstream firms
in equation (2.18). The coefficients of labor and energy have the expected positive sign and
statistically significant in both specifications. The market power parameter of the upstream
firm, λu, ranges from 0.102 to 0.290, which are both statistically different from zero and imply
a deviation from perfect competition. This range implies symmetric Cournot with four to
ten firms. The estimate of quantity on the marginal cost of upstream firms is recovered
from demand, upstream firms and downstream firms’ supply correspondences. They have
the expected positive sign and are between (0.0001, 0.0009). This is statistically significant
in column (1) and implies that the hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected.
Our instruments, which are the exogenous demand and supply shifters, are strongly cor-
related with the quantity. We report the first stage regression in table A.1. Both regressions
in columns (1) and (2) have F-statistics of 31.18 and 12.20 which is larger than the rule-
of-thumb F-statistic threshold of 10 for testing for weak instruments (Staiger and Stock,
1997).
2.6 Simulation Results
To gain a broad perspective of the effects of supply shocks on prices under market power,
we conduct simulations on the retail price and co-operative price as negative supply shocks
range from 0 to 90% for two market power scenarios: 1) given market power (symmetric
Cournot) and 2) perfect competition given the estimated market power parameters (λu and
λd), demand parameter (α1), supply parameters (τd and τu), and cost parameters (β and γ).
The retail price simulation results are summarized in figure 2.2 and table 2.5. Negative
supply shocks lead to a higher retail price. Under the given degree of market power, retail
price increases by $0.035 to $0.106 per lb as a reduction of fluid milk increases from 30%
to 90%. When market power is not exercised by both upstream and downstream firms
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(i.e., perfect competition), retail price increases by $0.042 to $0.127 per lb as a reduction
of fluid milk increases from 30% to 90%. These results are expected as pointed out in the
Proposition 1 where the firms with market power have the ability to adjust their price by
absorbing markup while the firms pass on the full extent of cost changes on the price under
perfect competitive markets. Thus, the perfect competition always overestimates the impact
of supply shocks on retail price than the given degree of market power.
Similarly, figure 2.3 and table 2.6 summarize the simulation results on co-operative price.
Negative supply shocks on supply lead to a higher co-operative price. Co-operative price
increases by $0.078 to $0.233 per lb as a reduction of fluid milk increases from 30% to 90%
under the given degree of market power. Under the perfect competitive market, co-operative
price increases from $0.087 to $0.262 per lb. Consistent with retail price, the impact of
supply shocks on co-operative is overestimated under the perfect competition than the given
degree of market power.
While retail price increases by $0.035 to $0.106 per lb due to the supply shocks under
the given degree of market power, the same magnitude of supply shocks increases the co-
operative price by $0.078 to $0.233 per lb. The change in co-operative price due to a supply
shock is about two times larger than the change in retail price under the same supply shocks.
As discussed in Proposition 4 , the price transmission is asymmetric between upstream and
downstream firms and the effect of the negative supply shocks on the co-operative price is
larger than on retail price. Since both upstream and downstream firms adjust their output
prices by absorbing their markup to offset a decrease in sales, the effect of the negative
supply shocks on the co-operative price is larger.
Additional simulation analyses were conducted to enhance our understanding of how
downstream and upstream firms’ market power impact prices with a supply shock. To
conduct the simulation analyses, we specify ranges of values for the market power parameters,
λu and λd, over the interval λu, λd ∈ [0, 1]. This allows us to demonstrate how the downstream
firms’ output price and upstream firms’ output price change as market power parameters
change. For these simulations, we assume a 50% negative supply shock.
Figure 2.4 depicts the effect of downstream firms’ market power on the retail price and co-
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operative price under the 50% negative supply shock. When the given degree of downstream
firms’ market power is not exercised and it is assumed zero, the retail price increase from $
0.367 to $ 0.433 per lb. However, the change in the retail price due to a supply shock decreases
as downstream firms’ market power increases. This result on retail price is consistent with
Proposition 1 . On the other hand, the co-operative price seems to be relatively flat
regardless of the degree of downstream firms’ market power. This result is in line with
Proposition 3 where the impact of downstream firms’ market power on the change in
upstream firms’ output price is ambiguous.
Next, we consider the impact of upstream firms’ market power on prices. Figure 2.5
depicts the effect of upstream firms’ market power on the retail price and co-operative price
under the 50% negative supply shock. Both expected retail and co-operative prices decline as
upstream firms exert additional market power. Besides, figure 2.5 indicates that the impact
of upstream firms’ market power on the change in the co-operative price is larger than in
the retail price.
These simulation results emphasize the role of both downstream and upstream market
power in analyzing the impact of supply shocks on prices. The results indicate that the
prefect competition assumption overestimates the effect of supply shocks on prices while the
monopoly assumption underestimates the effect of supply shocks on prices. These results
suggest that it is important to account for the presence of market power when considering
the impacts of a supply shock.
2.7 Conclusions
Given the increase in frequency and potential risks in supply shocks including foreign weather
and animal disease globally, it is important to accurately measure the impact of supply shocks
on prices at successive vertical stages. Previous literature has utilized partial equilibrium
models assuming perfectly competitive markets, which may not be appropriate when a mar-
ket is highly concentrated. Consequently, further attention needs to be paid to the issue of
imperfect competition in determining the effect of a supply shock on prices.
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In this article, we develop a conceptual framework to illustrate the role of market power
on the change in prices due to supply shocks by accounting for imperfect competition and
sequential vertical pricing games between upstream and downstream firms. Then, we use
structural estimation to link the theoretical framework regarding the impact of market power
on prices with an empirical framework. The estimated parameters from the empirical frame-
work allow us to conduct simulation analyses to evaluate the change in retail and co-operative
prices and have a better understanding of the role of market power in the change in prices.
Our finding indicates perfect competition always overestimates the impact of supply shocks
on prices than a given degree of market power.
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Table and Figures
Table 2.1: Mean and Standard Deviations of Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Units N mean sd
Cereal Price Index 120 106.2 5.219
Juices Price Index 120 112.2 5.663
Cheese Price Index 120 112.5 9.643
Coffee-Tea Price Index 120 113.5 7.168
Personal Income $ 120 31,663 1,347
Wage Index 120 98.81 2.288
Electricity cents per kwt 120 6.226 0.824
Diesel $ per gallon 120 2.856 0.477
Co-operative Price $ per lb. 120 0.153 0.0251
Retail Price $ per lb. 120 0.367 0.0358
Quantity Mil. lbs 120 368.6 19.89
Feed $ per cwt 120 5.715 0.858
Labor $ per cwt 120 1.334 0.0892
Fuel $ per cwt 120 5.807 0.311
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Table 2.2: Demand Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retail Price Retail Price
VARIABLES Coef SE Coef SE
Quantity -0.003 0.003 -0.011*** 0.004
Quantity*Juices 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
Personal Income 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
Cereal Price -0.004* 0.002 -0.006*** 0.002
Juices Price -0.018** 0.008 -0.038*** 0.012
Coffee-Tea Price 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001
Cheese Price 0.004*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001
Month = 2 0.053* 0.028
Month = 3 0.013 0.010
Month = 4 0.038** 0.018
Month = 5 0.029* 0.016
Month = 6 0.077** 0.036
Month = 7 0.067** 0.029
Month = 8 0.027** 0.012
Month = 9 0.029** 0.013
Month = 10 -0.000 0.008
Month = 11 0.016 0.010
Month = 12 0.005 0.009
Quarter = 2 0.007 0.005
Quarter = 3 0.009 0.006
Quarter = 4 -0.001 0.007
Constant 0.606 1.215 3.568** 1.444
Observations 120 120
R-squared 0.708 0.683
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.3: Downstream Firms’ Supply Correspondence Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retail Price Retail Price
VARIABLES Coef SE Coef SE
Quantity 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000
Quantity*Juices -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
Co-operative Price 0.915*** 0.144 0.699*** 0.149
Wage -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
Diesel 0.008 0.007 0.012* 0.007
Electricity 0.003 0.018 0.043*** 0.011
Month = 2 0.109*** 0.019
Month = 3 0.025* 0.013
Month = 4 0.071*** 0.016
Month = 5 0.060*** 0.016
Month = 6 0.141*** 0.029
Month = 7 0.118*** 0.029
Month = 8 0.045** 0.019
Month = 9 0.048** 0.022
Month = 10 0.001 0.012
Month = 11 0.029** 0.014
Month = 12 0.016 0.013
Quarter = 2 0.018* 0.010
Quarter = 3 -0.009 0.012
Quarter = 4 -0.022*** 0.008
Constant -0.868*** 0.194 -0.507** 0.232
λd 0.138** 0.058 0.093*** 0.024
τd 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
Observations 120 120
R-squared 0.442 0.318
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Upstream Firms’ Supply Correspondence Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Co-operative Price Co-operative Price
VARIABLES Coef SE Coef SE
Quantity 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
Quantity*Juices -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
Feed -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
Labor 0.107*** 0.027 0.103*** 0.025
Energy 0.059*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003
Month = 2 0.025*** 0.007
Month = 3 0.005 0.004
Month = 4 0.020*** 0.005
Month = 5 0.015*** 0.005
Month = 6 0.035*** 0.008
Month = 7 0.029*** 0.008
Month = 8 0.007 0.005
Month = 9 0.006 0.006
Month = 10 -0.008** 0.004
Month = 11 0.001 0.004
Month = 12 -0.004 0.004
Quarter = 2 0.005** 0.003
Quarter = 3 -0.000 0.003
Quarter = 4 -0.009*** 0.003
Constant -0.644*** 0.085 -0.417*** 0.065
λu 0.290*** 0.026 0.102*** 0.010
τu 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 120 120
R-squared 0.870 0.859
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 2.1: Impact of Supply Shock under Oligopoly Power
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Figure 2.2: Impact of Supply Shocks on Retail Rrice
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Table 2.5: Impact of Supply Shocks on Retail Price
% supply shocks Symmetric Cournot Perfect competition
(-) 30% $0.035 per lb ↑ $0.042 per lb ↑
(-) 45% $0.053 per lb ↑ $0.064 per lb ↑
(-) 60% $0.071 per lb ↑ $0.085 per lb ↑
(-) 75% $0.089 per lb ↑ $0.106 per lb ↑
(-) 90% $0.106 per lb ↑ $0.127 per lb ↑
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Figure 2.3: Impact of Supply Shocks on Co-operative Price
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Table 2.6: Impact of Supply Shocks on Co-operative Price
% supply shocks Symmetric Cournot Perfect competition
(-) 30% $0.078 per lb ↑ $0.087 per lb ↑
(-) 45% $0.117 per lb ↑ $0.131 per lb ↑
(-) 60% $0.156 per lb ↑ $0.175 per lb ↑
(-) 75% $0.194 per lb ↑ $0.218 per lb ↑
(-) 90% $0.233 per lb ↑ $0.262 per lb ↑
33
Figure 2.4: The Effect of Downstream Market Power on Retail and Co-operative Price
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Figure 2.5: The Effect of Downstream Market Power on Retail and Co-operative Price
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Chapter 3
Economic Value of Organic Labeling
in the Fluid Milk Market
3.1 Introduction
The organic food and drink industry has grown rapidly over the past two decades. By
2014, the entire U.S. organic market was estimated to be worth $35 billion, a nearly ten-fold
increase from 1997 (USDA, 2017). Within the organic sector, dairy has played a leading
role: Dairy has been the second-largest category of organic food, accounting for 15% of
U.S. organic food sales in 2012. Double-digit demand growth for organic milk products has
occurred despite high price premiums.
A large literature has found that consumers are willing to pay a premium for credence
attributes using stated or revealed preference data. Bernard and Bernard (2009) find that
consumers were willing to pay $0.73 per gallon for milk labeled as organic using an auction
experiment. Dhar and Foltz (2005) use revealed preferences of consumers to study consumer
benefits from the organic label and rBST-free milk using U.S. supermarket scanner data.
Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2007) estimate that U.S. households value the added USDA organic
seal on milk containers at $0.23, which equated to an increase in annual consumer welfare
of $2.1 billion. Kanter et al. (2009) find that the introduction of rBST-free and organic milk
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reduces consumers’ willingness to purchase conventional milk using experimental economics.
Brooks and Lusk (2010) determine consumer preferences for new attributes (milk from cloned
cows) in the market using both stated and revealed preferences. Wolf et al. (2011) use a choice
experiment to examine the value of various fluid milk attributes from consumers’ viewpoint.
Consumers of organic products are willing to pay a premium because they perceive organic
to be healthier, better for the environment, and better for animal welfare (Bonnet and
Bouamra-Mechemache, 2015).
Producing organic may be viewed as a product differentiation strategy that can generate
shifts toward organic products as consumers are willing to pay a premium for organic milk.
Thus, producing organic should be thought of as a profitable marketing strategy. However,
few studies have attempted to measure the economic worth of organic to producers, nor the
extent to which producers capture the additional surplus created by organic labeling. To
the best of our knowledge, no previous study has explicitly measured the extent to which
organic creates surplus for fluid milk firms.
The objective of this study is to provide new econometric evidence on the economic worth
of organic labeling from a producers standpoint. Using weekly data on retail prices, aggregate
market shares, and product characteristics, we estimate a structural econometric model of
organic and conventional milk demand. This demand model provides the foundation for
determining the impact of organic labeling on market shares, price premiums, and profits
for both organic and conventional milk brands.
To estimate the economic value of organic labeling, we use the model estimates to simulate
two counterfactual analyses in which 1) organic milk products are replaced by conventional
milk products, and 2) organic milk products are removed from the market. In other words,
we simulate counterfactuals in which 1) organic milk products no longer contain an organic
label and the marginal cost falls to the level of conventional products, and 2) previously
conventional milk products are the only products that remain on the market. The first
counterfactual is constructed as follows. First, we remove organic labels from organic milk
products by subtracting the additive separable effect of organic labeling in the consumer’s
utility function. Second, we subtract the additive organic effect on firms’ marginal costs. The
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third step uses the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium conditions to compute counterfactual prices;
that is, milk prices in an environment when the organic label does not exist. In the fourth
step, we use the model to determine counterfactual market shares for all milk brands in
the counterfactual environment. The final step combines all of this information to compute
changes in producer surplus, as well as the degree to which producers are able to extract
the additional surplus created by an organic. The second counterfactual is established as
follows. First, we remove organic products from consumers’ choice sets, we then find the set
of equilibrium first-order conditions without organic milk products. Second, counterfactual
market shares are calculated given the counterfactual prices. Finally, we compute changes
in producer surplus based on counterfactual markups and market shares.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the data.
Section 3.3 describes the structural empirical model. Section 3.4 offers results while Section
3.5 provides the counterfactual analysis. Finally, a section 3.6 provides the conclusion of the
paper.
3.2 Data
Prices and market shares were obtained from Information Resources Inc. (IRI) scanner
data. Information Resources Inc. scanner data is a Chicago based marketing research firm
specializing in archiving and analyzing store and household-level scanner data in randomly
selected U.S. markets. For the milk industry, IRI data provide weekly sales information for a
large number of retail stores, as well as information on several milk product characteristics,
including an indicator for organic labeling. The dairy markets are fairly localized, so only
a few brands appear in several regions (Choi et al., 2013). Thus, this study focuses on
purchases in a Northeastern metropolitan market over a time period of 53 weeks in 2012.1
A market is defined as a city-week combination; each time period is considered a market.
For each market, we randomly sample 200 draws from a normal distribution to capture
1The organic attribute of private label products is only revealed in 2012. Thus, we decide to focus only
on 2012.
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unobserved consumer heterogeneity.
Market shares for each product are defined by the aggregate quantity divided by the
total potential market size. The potential market size is typically calculated by multiplying
the total population of each metropolitan city by the average U.S. per capita consumption
(Nevo, 2001). However, Miller and Weinberg (2017) find that this generates a reasonable
amount of cross-region heterogeneity in “outside good shares”; the consumers may decide
not to purchase any of the brands, plausibly due to regional differences in the proportion
of supermarkets that report to IRI. Following Miller and Weinberg (2017), we define the
total potential market size to be 150% percent of the maximum observed unit sales in each
market. This approach mitigates the problems posed by the mismatch between population
and IRI-reported sales volumes. The market share of the outside good is computed as the
difference between one and the sum of the inside goods’ market share. In this paper, we
focus on the 100 products with the highest market share, which account for approximately
95% of the sales in the data.2
We define a product as a combination of brand and product characteristics. Product
characteristics include 1) size (0.125 gallons, 0.25 gallons, 0.5 gallons, 0.75 gallons, and 1
gallon), 2) fat content (fat free, low fat(1%), reduced-fat (2%), and whole milk), 3) package
(carton, plastic), 4) lactose labeling information (lactose free, full lactose), and 5) organic
labeling information (organic, conventional).3 Products with the same brand and product
characteristics, but sold in different stores are also aggregated as the same product. Average
prices are computed by dividing weekly sales revenue by weekly unit sales.
Table 3.1 shows prices and revenue-based market shares by brands, based on retail scanner
data. The average price over all products is $6.31 per gallon. The average price of organic
milk products is higher than the average price of non-organic milk price products by $2.23
per gallon. The average price of private label brands is cheaper than the average price of
national brands by $0.62 per gallon. Organic milk products account for 61.09% of retail
2Restricting the analysis to the top brands does not alter the results. Nevo (2001) states that “In principle,
the estimates of price sensitivity should not be biased by this sample selection, and indeed some analysis
performed with different samples suggests this is the case” (p.334).
3Private labels are aggregated into a single brand.
39
revenue while non-organic products account for 38.91% of total retail revenue. The revenue-
based market shares of private label brands are fairly similar to that of national brands. The
three national organic brands – Horizon Organic, Organic Valley, and Stonyfield Organic
– account for approximately 10.38% of total retail revenue and 17.42% of organic retail
revenue. Thus, most of organic sales come from private label brands.4
3.3 The Structural Model
A structural econometric model is used to estimate the impacts of organic on profit, price,
and market share of not only the own firm, but its competitors as well. The use of a structural
model allows one to run counterfactual scenarios. The econometric model for this paper is
a standard discrete choice demand model in a differentiated product setting (Berry et al.,
1995; Nevo, 2000, 2001). The price-cost margins are recovered from the demand estimates
without observing actual costs.
3.3.1 Demand Side
A random-coefficients logit model is employed to estimate consumer preferences for milk.
The indirect utility of consumer i from purchasing product j in market t can be written as
Uijt = dj + dm + xjβi − αipjt + ξjt + ijt (3.1)
where dj represents a product fixed effect capturing the intrinsic preference for product j, dm
are dummies for the monthly unobserved determinants of demand, xj are observable product
characteristics, pjt is the shelf price of product j at time period t, ξjt is the unobserved (by
econometrician) product characteristic, and ijt is an independent and identically distributed
type 1 extreme value distributed (i.i.d) error term capturing idiosyncratic preferences.
Since the observable product characteristics, xj, are time-invariant, the product fixed
effects, dj, absorb the observable product characteristics and, thus, the taste parameters, β,
4Prices and product characteristics for the top 100 products are reported in Appendix B.
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cannot be identified. To identify the taste coefficients, β, we regress the estimated brand
fixed effects on the characteristics, as in the minimum-distance procedure (Chamberlain,
1982; Nevo, 2001).
The random coefficients, βi and αi, represent the unknown consumer taste parameters for
the product characteristics and price, respectively. These coefficients vary across consumers
according to
[αi, βi]
′ = [α, β]′ + Συi (3.2)
where υi a vector that captures the unobserved consumer characteristics and Σ captures the
unobserved heterogeneity due to random shocks υi. Unobserved consumer characteristics υi
has a standard multivariate normal distribution, υi ∼ N(0, 1).
The mean utility of each product j, δjt, is given by
δjt = dj + dm + xjβ − αpjt + ξjt. (3.3)
The deviation from the mean utility that captures the effects of the random coefficient, µijt,
is given by
µilt = [pjt, xjt](Συi). (3.4)
The indirect utility from consuming j can be rewritten as
Uijt = δjt + µijt + ijt (3.5)
where the first term is the mean utility which is common to all consumers. The last two
terms represent a mean-zero heteroskedastic deviation from the mean utility that captures
the effects of the random coefficients.
To allow for the possibility of consumer i not purchasing any of the brands, an outside
good is included in the model. The outside option permits substitution between the consid-
ered products (i.e., inside goods) and a substitute or not purchasing milk at all. The mean
level of utility for the outside good, δ0t, is normalized to zero.
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The set of individual attributes that lead to the choice of product j is
Ajt = {(vi, i)|uijt ≥ uilt ∀l = 0, 1, ..., J}. (3.6)
Given that ijt is independent and identically distributed with an extreme value type 1
density, the market share of product j in market t is:
sjt =
∫
Ajt
(
exp(δjt + µijt)
1 +
∑J
l=1 exp(δlt + µilt)
)
dφ(υ)dυ. (3.7)
The predicted product market share given in equation (3.7) can be approximated by the
logit smoothed, accept-reject simulator given by
sjt =
1
ns
ns∑
i=1
exp(δjt + µijt)
1 +
∑J
l=1 exp(δlt + µilt)
(3.8)
where ns is the number of draws.
The own- and cross-price elasticities of the market share, sjt, are defined by
ηjkt =
∂sjt
∂pkt
· ppk
sjt

−pjt
sjt
∫
αisijt(1− sijt)dφ(υ)dυ if j=k,
pkt
sjt
∫
αisijtsiktdφ(υ)dυ otherwise
(3.9)
where sijt =
exp(δjt+µijt)
1+
∑J
l=1 exp(δlt+µilt)
is the probability of individual i purchasing product j in
market t.
3.3.2 Supply Side
The market we study is an oligopoly with multi-product firms. Assuming that firms simul-
taneously choose prices as in a Bertrand-Nash model of differentiated products, the profit of
firm F is given by
piF =
∑
j∈F
(pj −mcj)Msj(p) (3.10)
42
where sj is the market share of product j produced by firm F , M is the size of the market,
and mcj is the marginal cost for product j produced by firm F . The first-order condition
for any product j is given by
sj(p) +
∑
r∈F
(pr −mcr)∂sr(p)
∂pj
= 0. (3.11)
Let Ω be defined as the firm’s ownership structure where the element Ωij equals 1 when
both products i and j are sold by the same retailer, 0 otherwise. Let ∆ be a matrix of first-
order derivatives of product market shares with respect to prices, where ∆ij =
∂si
∂pj
. Then,
the system of first-order conditions is expressed in vector notation as follows
p−mc = −(Ω ∗∆)−1s(p). (3.12)
The marginal costs can be solved for as follows
m̂c = p+ (Ω ∗∆)−1s(p). (3.13)
Once the marginal costs are recovered, we regress the estimated marginal costs on the observ-
able product characteristics. We specify the following function for the estimated marginal
costs:
m̂c = Xjβ + db + dq + jt (3.14)
where Xj is a vector of the observable product characteristics (size, fat content, package,
lactose labeling information, and organic labeling information), db represents the brand fixed
effects, dq are dummies for the quarter fixed effect, and jt is the error term.
3.3.3 Estimation
In the case of the standard logit model, the mean utility δjt can be obtained analytically and
is given by δjt = ln(Sjt)− ln(S0t), where ln(Sjt) is the observed market share of product j in
43
market t and ln(S0t) is the observed market share of the outside good. Since a linear function
of the parameters to be estimated is given and the left-hand side is directly observable from
the data along with price and observable product characteristics, we can estimate α and β
using ordinary least square (OLS) or two stage least square (2SLS).
One problematic feature of the standard logit model is its unreasonable cross substitu-
tion pattern. In the standard logit model, the cross-price elasticities imply that a change
in the price of a product changes the demand of all other substitute products by the same
percentage. It comes from the assumption that the random shock is identically indepen-
dently distributed. The random coefficients logit model mitigates the unreasonable cross
substitution pattern by generating a correlation of the random shocks to utility with brands.
The estimation strategy used for the model is the Generalized Methods of Moments
(GMM) used by Berry (1994), Berry et al. (1995), Nevo (2000), and Nevo (2001). The
GMM objective function is constructed by a product of instruments and the structural error
term, ξjt, where
ξjt = δjt − (xjβ − αpjt). (3.15)
The GMM optimization problem is
min
θ1,θ2
ξ′ZΦ−1Z ′ξ (3.16)
where Z is a set of instruments that are orthogonal to the error term and Φ−1 is the the
standard weighting matrix. Let θ = (θ1, θ2) be a vector of all parameters of the model
where θ1 is a vector of the linear parameters and θ2 is a vector of the non-linear parameters.
Equation (3.16) is a function of both θ1, the linear parameters, and the mean utility, δjt.
By taking the the first-order condition of the objective function with respect to the linear
parameters, θ1, we can derive the linear parameters as follows
θ1 =
α
β
 = (X ′ZΦ−1Z ′X)−1X ′ZΦ−1Z ′δ (3.17)
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Note that after θ1 is substituted by the first-order condition of the objective function, δjt is
the only unknown in equation (3.17). Then, the structural error term only enters the mean
utility, δ.
Now we can solve for the mean utility, δ, by setting the observed product shares, Sjt,
equal to the predicted product shares, sjt,
Sjt = sjt(δjt; θ2). (3.18)
As mentioned above, in the logit model, δ can be computed analytically by δjt = ln(Sjt) −
ln(S0t). On the other hand, in the random coefficients model, the system of equations in
(3.18) is non-linear and should be solved numerically for δjt. It can be solved by using the
contraction mapping suggested by Berry et al. (1995).
In the random coefficient model, θ is obtained by Method of Simulated Moments following
(Nevo, 2000)’s estimation algorithm. We minimize the objective function using the Nelder-
Mead non-derivative (Simplex) search algorithm. The Nelder-Mead search algorithm is more
robust and mitigates the sensitivity issue of the initial value in a quasi-Newton method which
is based on a user-supplied gradient. Following Villas-Boas (2007), the optimum obtained
with the Nelder-Mead algorithm is passed to a gradient-based quasi-Newton algorithm to
find a minimum of the simulated GMM objective function.
The intuition behind the estimation technique is that the mean level of utility, δjt, must
be such that the observed product market shares equal the predicted product market shares.
With the values of δjt, we substitute them into the objective function and solve for θ.
In summary, the estimation procedure is as follows:
1. Guess values of mean utility, δ, and nonlinear parameters, θ2;
2. Given δ and θ2, compute predicted market shares;
3. Given θ2, search for δ that equates the predicted market shares and the observed market
shares;
4. Given δ, compute the structural error error term, ∆ξjt;
5. Form the GMM objective function as a function of θ;
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6. Search for the value of θ that minimizes the GMM objective function;
7. Repeat steps (2)–(6) with different starting values from (1) until the minimum GMM
objective is found; and
8. Iterate on steps (2)–(7) until optimal GMM estimators are recovered.
3.3.4 Instruments
The identifying assumption to estimate the model is
E[ξ|Z] = 0 (3.19)
where ξ is the demand unobservables and Z is the set of instruments. Equation (3.19) implies
that the demand unobservables should be mean independent of the set of instruments. If
price is correlated with the unobserved product characteristics, then the price estimate would
be inconsistent. Thus, it requires a set of exogenous instrumental variables.
Prices consist of marginal costs and a markup term. The markup term is a function of
the unobserved product characteristics, which is also correlated with unobserved consumer
preference in the demand equation. Thus, prices are not exogenous to unobserved changes
in product characteristics, so a set of instruments for the price is needed.
The instruments which control for the endogeneity issue of the price should be correlated
with the underlying variable, price, but independent of the unobserved error terms. There
are several ways to instrument for prices. Berry et al. (1995) use characteristics that enter
cost, but not demand. Nevo (2001) relies on the use of prices of the product in other markets.
Villas-Boas (2007) uses prices of inputs interacted with a product dummy variable to generate
variations by products. We follow Villas-Boas (2007) and use manufacturer level input price
changes interacted with brand dummies as instrumental variables. It is reasonable since
the prices of inputs are uncorrelated with unobserved product characteristics, but correlated
with the shelf display price. In addition, the intuition for interacting input prices with brand
dummies is that it allows each input to enter the production function of each milk product
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differently.
Since raw milk prices are regulated under marketing orders and do not vary over time, we
use weekly commodity trading prices of nonfat dry milk powder and whole milk powder for
the industrial sector and retail diesel prices to instrument for prices of milk products following
Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2007). In other words, we interact 1) nonfat dry milk powder, 2)
whole milk powder and 3) diesel prices with product dummies. Weekly commodity trading
prices and retail diesel prices were collected from Livestock Marketing Information Center
(LMIC) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration, respectively.
3.4 Results
Table 3.2 presents the results from the logit estimation where we regress ln(Sjt) − ln(Sot)
on the observed product characteristics. Columns (1) – (2) report the OLS estimates while
columns (3) – (4) correspond to the IV estimates. Both regressions include brand dummy
variables and monthly fixed effects. In both specifications, the mean price coefficients, α, are
negative and statistically significant. The variable of interest, organic label, is statistically
significant, with estimated coefficients of 1.250 and 1.451 in the OLS and IV specifications,
respectively. This indicates that organic labeling has a positive effect on consumer utility.
Columns (5) – (6) provide the estimated coefficients from the random coefficient model.
The results of linear coefficients are seem plausible in terms of sign and are similar to the
standard logit estimation results. Consumers prefer cheaper products with a mean price es-
timate of -0.563. The variable of interest, organic labeling, exhibits a positive and significant
value and thus indicates the positive impact of the organic label on consumer utility. The
price and organic coefficient indicate that consumers are willing to pay a significant premium
for organic milk products. In particular, the mean willingness to pay for organic labeling
can be estimated by the organic labeling coefficient divided by the price coefficient and it is
$2.47 per gallon of milk.
Table 3.2 also reports deviations from the mean estimates. The standard deviation
of price, 2% milkfat, plastic package, and organic are statistically significant, suggesting
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that consumers’ preference for these characteristics are likely to be heterogeneous. On the
other hand, consumers’ preference for milk size, fat-free, whole milk, and lactose-free are
homogenous across consumers as their estimates of the standard deviations are statistically
insignificant.5
Table 3.3 reports average own and cross-price elasticities by brand calculated from the
demand equation estimation results. Average own and cross-price elasticities range from -
2.167 to -4.208 and 0.013 to 0.016, respectively. The average own-price elasticities for organic
brands is -3.770, which is higher than those of conventional brands (-2.922). It indicates
that purchases of organic milk are more sensitive to changes in own prices compared to
conventional milk. This result is consistent with previous studies (Alviola and Capps, 2010;
Bonnet and Bouamra-Mechemache, 2015; Dhar and Foltz, 2005).
Given the estimated demand estimates, we compute the price-cost margin estimate with
a random coefficient demand model using equation (3.12). Table 3.4 provides the average
price-cost margins by brand. Across all 100 products, the average price-cost margin is $2.23
per gallon, which accounts for 38.32% of the retail price. The average margin for private
label products is higher than other brands.
Table 3.5 reports estimation results for marginal cost function. Each column reports the
effect of organic labeling on the marginal cost for different model specifications. Column (1)
reports the results without brand fixed effects and quarter fixed effects. Columns (2) and
(3) present the results with brand fixed effects and with both brand effects and quarter fixed
effects, separately. The results indicate that producing organic increases marginal costs by
$1.62 to $1.64 per gallon. The products with larger package sizes have a lower marginal cost.
The plastic package leads to a decrease in marginal cost compared to the carton package
while lactose-free increases marginal cost.
5The first stage R-squared and F -statistic of the IV specification indicate that our instruments, which is
the interaction between nonfat dry milk powder, whole milk powder and diesel price with product dummies,
are strongly correlated with the price variable. The first stage R-squared is 0.98 and F -statistic is 745.38
which is substantially larger than the rule-of-thumb F-statistic threshold of 10 for testing for weak instru-
ments. The F -test to test for zero coefficient associated with instruments is rejected at any significance level.
These suggest that the instruments used in the demand model are valid.
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3.5 Counterfactuals
To analyze the impact of organic labeling on market shares, price premiums, and profits, we
assume two counterfactual environments. In the first counterfactual environment, we answer
the following question: what would market shares, price premiums, and profits for organic
products have been if they were sold as conventional products instead of organic products.
To do so, we remove the organic labeling attribute from the consumers’ utility function
and marginal costs function, respectively.6 In the second counterfactual environment, we
assume there are no organic products by removing organic products from the choice set.
Here we are interested in what market shares, price premiums, and profits for both organic
and conventional milk producers would have been if organic brands had exited the market
instead of becoming conventional products.
3.5.1 Removing Organic Attribute
In our demand estimation, we find that organic labeling has a positive and statistically
significant effect on consumer utility. We also show that the organic characteristic leads to a
higher marginal cost. Given these findings, we explore the economic value of organic in the
U.S. milk market by translating 1) the positive effect of organic labeling on consumer utility
and 2) the higher marginal cost of producing organic into the price premium and sales.
Change in Market Share
In order to assess the effect of organic on the price-cost margin and sales, we analyze the
extent to which organic characteristic generates shifts in market share. We run the counter-
factual analysis by assuming the absence of the organic characteristic and compare it with
a regime where the organic characteristic exists.
We calculate the new market share of organic milk products in an environment where
consumers choose a product 1) without the extra “utility” generated by organic labeling and
6In the first counterfactual scenario, we remove private label organic brands. Otherwise, there exists two
different private label conventional brands in the counterfactual environment, which is not realistic.
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2) with decreased product prices as the marginal costs of producing organic falls to the level
of conventional products.
Therefore, the counterfactual indirect utility of each organic product, U cijt, can be derived
by excluding the positive values of the organic labeling effect and applying decreased marginal
costs:
U cijt = δ
c
jt + µ
c
ijt + ijt. (3.20)
With the counterfactual indirect utility, we calculate the counterfactual market share of the
organic products in the absence of organic as follows
scjt =
1
ns
ns∑
i=1
exp(δcjt + µ
c
ijt)
1 +
∑J
l=1 exp(δ
c
lt + µ
c
ilt)
. (3.21)
Change in Price Premium
We now turn to calculate the counterfactual price-cost margin. To calculate the new equi-
librium price, we need to estimate the counterfactual marginal costs of producing milk. The
counterfactual marginal costs, m̂cc, can be derived by assuming the organic characteristic
is absent in the marginal cost function for organic products. In other words, we assume
that the marginal costs of producing organic milk products fall to the level of conventional
products as the organic milk products are replaced by conventional milk products. Given the
counterfactual market share and marginal costs, the counterfactual price premium generated
by the absence of organic can be calculated as follows:
p∗ = m̂cc − (Ω ∗∆)−1s(p∗)c (3.22)
where p∗ is the counterfactual price with the absence of the organic characteristics and m̂cc
are the counterfactual marginal costs recovered.
New equilibrium prices will be solved by the use of a numerical algorithm. The algorithm
finds the new equilibrium prices which solves the FOC under the counterfactual experiment
given the estimated demand parameters, product characteristics, and the marginal costs.
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New equilibrium prices indicate what the firms charge without the existence of organic
labeling. By comparing the initial price, p, and the counterfactual prices, p∗, we can assess
how much of the price premium due to the organic. The profit function in equation (3.10)
allows the counterfactual profit to be estimated.
3.5.2 Removing Organic Products
In this counterfactual, we assume there are no organic products available as a choice to
the consumers. Counterfactual conventional products’ prices solve the set of equilibrium
first-order conditions with the absence of organic products, as follows:
p∗∗ = mc− (Ωc ∗∆)−1s(p∗∗) (3.23)
where p∗∗ is counterfactual price with the absence of organic products. Ωc is the counterfac-
tual firm’s ownership structure with the absence of organic products.
Determining the economic value of organic by removing organic products requires an
assumption; the marginal costs of producing conventional milk are the same with or without
the presence of organic products. Given the counterfactual price with the absence of organic
products, we also calculate the counterfactual market share.
3.5.3 Counterfactuals Results
Given our finding that organic label has a positive impact on consumer utility and increases
the marginal costs of producing milk, we assess the economic value of organic in the fluid
milk market by conducting two counterfactual analyses.
Table 3.6 summarizes the changes in market share with the presence of the organic label.
Column (1) shows the results from removing the organic attribute. The results indicate
that the presence of an organic label increases the market share for organic brands by ap-
proximately 33% compared to producing conventional milk. The presence of an organic
label decreases market shares for conventional brands by 2.59% to 5.58% since some con-
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sumers who purchase organic products are likely to switch to conventional products with
the absence of organic products. These results show that the positive impact of consumers’
willingness to pay for organic products on market share exceeds the negative impact of in-
creasing marginal costs due to organic production. The presence of organic labeling leads
consumers to organic products despite of higher price. Column (2) presents the results from
removing organic products. No market share would have been expected for organic brands if
the organic brands exit the market rather than producing conventional brands, as described
in column (1). The results in column (2) also show that market shares for conventional
brands would have increased if organic brands exit the business. These results imply that
organic consumers would have switched to conventional milk brands when organic brands
no longer exist in the market.
Having shown that there is an increase in the market share for organic milk brands when
removing the organic attribute and organic products, we calculate the equilibrium prices by
solving the set of equilibrium first-order conditions under two counterfactual environments
from equation (3.22) and (3.23). Table 3.7 presents the equilibrium price changes with
the presence of the organic label. The results in column (1) show that the equilibrium
price changes for previously organic brands would have decreased about by $1.6. These
results are mainly attributed to a decrease in the marginal costs of producing conventional
milk compared to organic milk, as shown in table 3.5. However, the degree of change in
equilibrium prices is slightly smaller than that of changes in marginal costs since firms do not
pass the full extent of cost changes into their prices and the effect of changes in market share
is relatively small. The conventional milk brands would have charged higher prices if the
organic brands produce conventional products rather than organic products as consumers for
organic products are likely to switch conventional milk products with the absence of organic
label described in table 3.6. Column (2) presents the change in the equilibrium prices when
removing organic products. As consumers switch to conventional milk with the absence of
organic brands, conventional milk brands would charge higher prices for their products under
the counterfactual scenario. Thus, the organic label leads to a decrease in conventional milk
prices.
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Profit for producers can be calculated by multiplying the price-cost margin by the size
of the market and the market share. Table 3.8 describes producer welfare changes with the
presence of an organic label. The presence of an organic label increases producer surplus
for organic milk by approximately 33%, which is similar to the changes in market share.
Producer surplus for conventional milk brands would have increased by about 4% to 7% if
the organic brands produce conventional products while it might have increased by about
8% to 12% if the organic brands exit the market.7 In summary, the impact on price, share,
and producer surplus for conventional brands are greater when removing organic products
compared to removing the organic attribute. The conventional milk brands would have
benefited more from organic brands’ exiting the market than producing conventional milk.
3.6 Conclusions
The organic food and drink industry has grown substantially over the past two decades;
however, the economic value of organic from a producer standpoint is rarely known. This
paper investigates the economic worth of organic in the fluid milk market using weekly
scanner data on retail prices and market shares. A structural econometric model is used to
estimate demand estimators on U.S. fluid milk over a time period of 53 weeks in 2012. Given
the demand estimates, we recover the price-cost margins and conduct the two counterfactual
scenarios; what would happen if organic brands 1) produce conventional products instead
of organic products or 2) exit the fluid milk market? To do this, we 1) remove the organic
attribute from the consumer utility and marginal costs and 2) remove organic brands.
In this study, we find that consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for organic
milk products. Consumers’ willingness to pay for the organic label is $2.47 per gallon of
milk. The results from marginal cost function indicate that producing organic increases the
marginal costs by approximately $1.6 per gallon of milk. Using these results, we estimate
the impacts of organic on market share, price, and producer surplus of not only the own
7Organic milk brands earn approximately $1.6 to $3.3 million in extra revenue from staying in the organic
milk business. Note that the IRI sample covers more than 20% of the relevant population in most cities
(Nevo, 2001).
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firm, but its competitors as well with two counterfactual analyses. The presence of organic
labeling increases market shares and producer surplus organic milk brands by about 33 to
100%. On the other hand, it decreases market shares and producer surplus for conventional
brands. We also find that the impact on price, market share, and producer surplus for
conventional brands are greater when removing organic products compared to removing the
organic attribute, as expected.
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Table and Figures
Table 3.1: Price and Revenue Shares
Brand Price ($/gallon) Shares (%)
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.554 3.727
FARMLAND 5.214 0.601
FARMLAND DAIRIES 4.964 1.683
FARMLAND SPECIAL REQUEST SKIM 8.182 4.942
GARELICK FARMS 4.071 0.123
HOOD LACTAID 8.930 8.290
HOOD SIMPLY SMART 7.328 0.189
HORIZON ORGANIC 9.435 3.291
LEHIGH VALLEY DAIRY FARMS 5.928 0.087
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS 6.562 0.305
ORGANIC VALLEY 9.025 2.637
PRIVATE LABEL 5.860 50.710
SMART BALANCE 7.195 0.851
SMART BALANCE HEART RIGHT 7.096 0.174
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 8.641 4.452
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 5.371 12.163
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS O. T. M 7.037 0.290
TUSCAN TRUMOO 4.833 0.317
WELSH FARMS 3.963 0.251
National brands 6.479 44.375
Private label 5.860 50.710
Non-organic products 5.866 33.994
Organic products 8.097 61.091
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Table 3.2: Parameter Estimates For Alternative Demand Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Logit IV Logit RC
VARIABLES Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Linear parameters
Price -0.341*** 0.009 -0.475*** 0.022 -0.563*** 0.049
0.25 gallon 0.233*** 0.051 0.477*** 0.027 0.674*** 0.027
0.5 gallon 0.487*** 0.099 0.617*** 0.091 0.848*** 0.091
0.75 gallon 0.327** 0.157 0.604*** 0.134 0.848*** 0.139
2% milkfat 0.141** 0.061 0.160*** 0.054 -0.265*** 0.044
Fat free 0.168*** 0.062 0.273*** 0.050 0.195*** 0.057
Whole 0.300*** 0.071 0.452*** 0.032 0.418*** 0.045
Plastic 0.296*** 0.093 0.136* 0.080 0.041 0.083
Lactose free 1.141*** 0.099 1.356*** 0.062 1.361*** 0.068
Organic 1.250*** 0.079 1.451*** 0.043 1.392*** 0.034
Constant 0.450*** 0.094 0.469*** 0.080 0.313*** 0.087
Nonlinear parameters
Price 0.106*** 0.032
0.25 gallon 0.142 0.406
0.5 gallon 0.089 0.938
0.75 gallon 0.822 0.621
2% milkfat 1.172*** 0.417
Fat free 0.441 0.404
Whole 0.109 0.351
Plastic 0.860** 0.416
Lactose free 0.029 0.430
Organic 0.368* 0.195
Constant 0.139*** 0.042
Observations 5,300 5,300 5,300
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks ***,**, and * denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 level, respectively. All regressions include product, monthly, and geographic market location
dummy variables.
Estimates from the Generalized Least Square regression of estimated product fixed effects on non-price
product characteristics.
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Table 3.3: Mean Estimated Own and Cross-price Elasticities
Brand Own price Cross-price
ELMHURST DAIRY -2.418 0.015
FARMLAND -2.715 0.015
FARMLAND DAIRIES -2.614 0.016
FARMLAND SPECIAL REQUEST SKIM -3.772 0.013
GARELICK FARMS -2.222 0.016
HOOD LACTAID -4.056 0.014
HOOD SIMPLY SMART -3.534 0.014
HORIZON ORGANIC -4.208 0.014
LEHIGH VALLEY DAIRY FARMS -3.039 0.017
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS -3.255 0.014
ORGANIC VALLEY -4.090 0.014
PRIVATE LABEL -2.760 0.014
PRIVATE LABEL (organic) -3.298 0.015
SMART BALANCE -3.475 0.014
SMART BALANCE HEART RIGHT -3.444 0.014
STONYFIELD ORGANIC -3.957 0.014
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS -2.751 0.015
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS O. T. M -3.429 0.014
TUSCAN TRUMOO -2.549 0.015
WELSH FARMS -2.167 0.016
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics on Prices, Product Markups and Recovered Marginal Costs
Brand Price ($/gallon) Markups ($/gallon) MC ($/gallon)
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.554 1.924 2.629
FARMLAND 5.214 1.923 3.291
FARMLAND DAIRIES 4.964 1.912 3.052
FARMLAND SPECIAL REQUEST SKIM 8.182 2.208 5.973
GARELICK FARMS 4.071 1.833 2.238
HOOD LACTAID 8.930 2.278 6.652
HOOD SIMPLY SMART 7.328 2.073 5.255
HORIZON ORGANIC 9.435 2.276 7.159
LEHIGH VALLEY DAIRY FARMS 5.928 1.950 3.978
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS 6.562 2.017 4.545
ORGANIC VALLEY 9.025 2.233 6.792
PRIVATE LABEL 5.510 3.024 2.486
PRIVATE LABEL (organic) 6.693 3.148 3.545
SMART BALANCE 7.195 2.074 5.121
SMART BALANCE HEART RIGHT 7.096 2.058 5.038
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 8.641 2.226 6.415
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 5.371 2.102 3.269
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS O. T. M 7.037 2.053 4.984
TUSCAN TRUMOO 4.833 1.895 2.938
WELSH FARMS 3.963 1.832 2.131
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Table 3.5: Marginal Cost Function Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
0.25 gallon 1.418*** 1.803*** 1.803***
(0.0455) (0.0298) (0.0297)
0.5 gallon 1.348*** 1.126*** 1.126***
(0.0320) (0.0152) (0.0152)
0.75 gallon 2.059*** 0.627*** 0.627***
(0.0741) (0.0469) (0.0467)
2% milkfat 0.0661* -0.00437 -0.00437
(0.0346) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Fat free 0.0930** 0.155*** 0.155***
(0.0366) (0.0188) (0.0188)
Whole -0.0676** 0.0168 0.0168
(0.0335) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Plastic -1.200*** -0.597*** -0.597***
(0.0387) (0.0339) (0.0339)
Lactose free 1.977*** 0.300*** 0.300***
(0.0700) (0.0848) (0.0846)
Organic 1.637*** 1.619*** 1.619***
(0.0399) (0.0350) (0.0350)
Constant 2.993*** 2.009*** 2.025***
(0.0504) (0.0432) (0.0447)
Brand Fixed Effects Y Y
Quarter Fixed Effects Y
Observations 5,300 5,300 5,300
R-squared 0.735 0.940 0.940
Note: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks ***,**, and * denotes significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Change in Share with the Presence of an Organic Label
(1) (2)
Brand Difference (%) Difference (%)
ELMHURST DAIRY -4.63 -7.59
FARMLAND -4.76 -7.64
FARMLAND DAIRIES -4.81 -7.70
FARMLAND SPECIAL REQUEST SKIM -5.46 -9.49
GARELICK FARMS -4.75 -7.42
HOOD LACTAID -5.50 -9.41
HOOD SIMPLY SMART -5.58 -9.78
HORIZON ORGANIC 33.29 0.245*
LEHIGH VALLEY DAIRY FARMS -5.30 -8.94
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS -5.51 -9.67
ORGANIC VALLEY 33.48 0.204*
PRIVATE LABEL -2.59 -4.38
PRIVATE LABEL (organic) 0.274* 0.274*
SMART BALANCE -5.50 -9.61
SMART BALANCE HEART RIGHT -5.52 -9.65
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 33.29 0.360*
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS -4.32 -7.00
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS O. T. M -5.47 -9.58
TUSCAN TRUMOO -4.66 -7.41
WELSH FARMS -4.67 -7.25
Note: Specification (1) presents the result from removing organic attribute. In specification (2), the result
from removing organic products is presented. * shows absolute change (%) in share.
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Table 3.7: Equilibrium Prices with the Presence of an Organic Label
(1) (2)
Brand With organic Without organic Difference Without organic Difference
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.554 4.567 -0.014 4.579 -0.026
FARMLAND 5.214 5.225 -0.011 5.235 -0.021
FARMLAND DAIRIES 4.964 4.975 -0.011 4.985 -0.022
FARMLAND SPECIAL REQUEST SKIM 8.182 8.208 -0.026 8.237 -0.055
GARELICK FARMS 4.071 4.080 -0.009 4.088 -0.017
HOOD LACTAID 8.930 8.959 -0.029 8.993 -0.063
HOOD SIMPLY SMART 7.328 7.345 -0.018 7.365 -0.037
HORIZON ORGANIC 9.435 7.830 1.605 0.000 9.435
LEHIGH VALLEY DAIRY FARMS 5.928 5.940 -0.012 5.952 -0.024
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS 6.562 6.578 -0.017 6.597 -0.035
ORGANIC VALLEY 9.025 7.421 1.604 0.000 9.025
PRIVATE LABEL 5.510 5.564 -0.054 5.601 -0.092
PRIVATE LABEL (organic) 6.693 0.000 6.693 0.000 6.693
SMART BALANCE 7.195 7.213 -0.018 7.232 -0.038
SMART BALANCE HEART RIGHT 7.096 7.113 -0.017 7.131 -0.036
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 8.641 7.029 1.612 0.000 8.641
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 5.371 5.391 -0.021 5.408 -0.037
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS O. T. M 7.037 7.054 -0.007 7.073 -0.036
TUSCAN TRUMOO 4.833 4.843 -0.010 4.853 -0.020
WELSH FARMS 3.963 3.972 -0.009 3.979 -0.016
Note: $ per gallon. Specification (1) presents the result from removing organic attribute. In specification
(2), the result from removing organic products is presented.
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Table 3.8: Producer Welfare Changes with the Presence of an Organic Label
(1) (2)
Brand Difference (%) Difference (%)
ELMHURST DAIRY -5.24 -9.02
FARMLAND -5.38 -8.83
FARMLAND DAIRIES -5.44 -8.91
FARMLAND SPECIAL REQUEST SKIM -6.49 -12.19
GARELICK FARMS -5.22 -8.39
HOOD LACTAID -6.77 -12.36
HOOD SIMPLY SMART -6.45 -11.74
HORIZON ORGANIC 32.83 2,045,908*
LEHIGH VALLEY DAIRY FARMS -5.96 -10.29
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS -6.34 -11.57
ORGANIC VALLEY 32.98 1,640,015*
PRIVATE LABEL -3.93 -7.66
PRIVATE LABEL (organic) 3,274,667* 3,274,667*
SMART BALANCE -6.34 -11.60
SMART BALANCE HEART RIGHT -6.31 -11.55
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 33.05 2,767,213
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS -5.22 -8.88
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS O. T. M -6.39 -11.48
TUSCAN TRUMOO -5.25 -8.53
WELSH FARMS -5.17 -8.22
Note: Specification (1) presents the result from removing organic attribute. In specification (2), the result
from removing organic products is presented. * shows absolute change ($) in producer welfare.
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Chapter 4
Summary
Given the increase in frequency and potential risks of supply shocks in the food industry,
it is important to accurately measure the impact of supply shocks on prices at successive
vertical stages. Although organic labeling should be thought of as a profitable marketing
strategy, little is known about the economic value of organic labeling to producers. In this
dissertation, those issues will be examined by focusing on the U.S. fluid milk industry.
In the first essay, I investigate the role of upstream and downstream market power in
determining the effect of supply shocks on price transmission. A structural econometric
model is used to measure seller market power and simulate results to analyze how market
power impacts the effects of supply shock on prices in the U.S. fluid milk industry. The
estimation results suggest that the assumption of perfect competition for upstream and
downstream firms in the U.S. fluid milk industry is rejected. The slope of the marginal cost
of downstream and upstream firms represents a deviation from constant to returns to scale.
The simulation results show that perfect competition overestimates the impact of a supply
shock on prices than a given degree of market power.
Some caveats are worth nothing. First, this paper does not account for heterogeneity
in upstream and downstream firms’ market power across regions. With a limited number
of observations, it is difficult to take heterogeneous market power parameters into account.
Thus, this paper estimates the average market power parameters in the U.S. milk market
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and explores the impact of supply shocks on price transmission at the national level.
Second, I assume a simple linear pricing model, double-marginalization, where upstream
firms will set their output price and downstream firms follow by setting downstream firms’
output price. Several studies assess welfare effects under different models of vertical relation-
ships between upstream and downstream firms such as two-part tariffs, manufacturer-level
collusion model, retail-level collusion model, and monopolist model (Bonnet and Dubois,
2010; Bonnet et al., 2013; Bonnet and Re´quillart, 2013; Villas-Boas, 2007). A potential
extension to this paper is to explore the role of upstream and downstream market power
in determining the effect of supply shocks on price transmission under different vertical re-
lationships between upstream and downstream firms in addition to double-marginalization.
This would allow policy-makers to have a better understanding of the economic consequences
of the potential supply shocks.
In the second essay, I estimate a structural econometric model of organic and conventional
milk demand. This demand model provides the foundation for determining the impact
of organic labeling on market shares, price premiums, and profits for both organic and
conventional milk brands. The demand estimates represent that the mean willingness to
pay for organic labeling is $2.47 per gallon of milk. The results from supply side indicates
that the average price-cost margin is $2.23 per gallon, accounting for 38.32% of the retail
price. Also, producing organic increases marginal costs by $1.64 per gallon. The results from
counterfactual analyses indicate that the presence of organic labeling increases market shares
and producer surplus organic milk brands by about 33 (when removing organic attributes)
to 100% (when removing organic brands). On the other hand, it decreases market shares and
producer surplus for conventional brands. Additionally, the impact on price, market share,
and producer surplus for conventional brands are greater when removing organic products
compared to removing the organic attribute.
Despite the findings on the impact of organic labeling on market shares, price premiums,
and profits for both organic and conventional milk brands, there are shortcomings. This
paper did not take vertical relationships between manufacturer and retailer into account and
assumes an integrated manufacturer-retailer for the U.S. fluid milk industry. A potential
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extension of this paper is to examine retailers and manufacturer vertical relationships and
calculate the economic value of organic labeling for manufacturer and retailer separately.
This dissertation has some implications for the literature. First, the first essay highlights
the importance of market power on price transmission at successive vertical stages. The re-
sults from the conceptual model and simulations imply that perfect competition assumption
is inappropriate to measure the impact of supply shocks on price transmission since perfect
competition overestimates the impact of a supply shock on prices than a given degree of
market power. Methodologically, the model that estimates the degree of price transmission
resulting from a supply shock can be applied to markets of other agricultural products. Sec-
ond, the second essay adds to the organic literature in the fluid milk market by focusing
on the economic worth of organic from a producers viewpoint. Despite the expansion of
the organic food and drink industry, few studies attempted to measure the economic value
of organic labeling in producer surplus and it is under researched whether an organic la-
bel creates value for the producer and, if so, how much the extent to which organic label
creates surplus for fluid milk firms. A related study by Bonnet and Bouamra-Mechemache
(2015) find that an organic label permits the existence of higher margins by computing and
comparing margins for organic brands and conventional brands. They did not, however,
explicitly estimate the counterfactual where the absence of organic is assumed. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to measure the economic worth of organic labeling
from a producer’s viewpoint by conducting counterfactual analyses. Third, the second essay
conducted the analysis based on structural models, which allows to describe the mechanisms
behind product sales through which effects operate. Thus, the second essay provides the
framework for understanding how an organic labeling may translate into producer surplus
through changes in consumer utility, market share, and equilibrium price.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
This appendix provides the derivation of the equilibrium downstream firms and upstream
firms’ output price and reports the results of the first stage regression. First, we rearrange
equation (2.4) when the marginal costs curve of the upstream firms shifts to the left due to
a supply shock, as follows:
h(Q) + λdh
′(Q)Q− βd − τdQ− γdR + λu[h′(Q)Q+ λdh′′(Q)Q2 + λdh′(Q)Q]
= βu + γuW + τu(Q+X)
(A1)
h(Q), h′(Q), and h′′(Q) are replaced with −α0
α1
+ 1
α1
Q− α2
α1
Y , 1
α1
, and 0, respectively:
− α0
α1
+
1
α1
Q− α2
α1
Y +
λd
α1
Q− βd − τdQ− γdR + λu[ 1
α1
+
λd
α1
Q]
= βu + γuW + τu(Q+X)
(A2)
We rearrange the equation (A2) to solve for the equilibrium output after supply shocks, Q∗:
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Q∗ =
α1
(1 + λu)(1 + λd)− α1(τu + τd) [
α0
α1
]
+
α1
(1 + λu)(1 + λd)− α1(τu + τd) [
α2Y
α1
]
+
α1
(1 + λu)(1 + λd)− α1(τu + τd) [βd + γdR + βu + γuW ]
+
α1
(1 + λu)(1 + λd)− α1(τu + τd) [τuX].
(A3)
Given Q = α0 + α1p
d + α2Y , we solve for p
d:
pd = β2 + β3Y + β4[βu + γuR + βd + γdW ] + β5X. (A4)
where
β2 =
−(λd + λu + λdλu) + α1(τu + τd)
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) (
α0
α1
),
β3 =
−(λd + λu + λdλu) + α1(τu + τd)
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) (
α2
α1
),
β4 =
1
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) , and
β5 =
τu
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) .
Additionally, the upstream firms’ inverse derived demand in equation (2.4) can be rewritten
as:
pu = −α0
α1
+
1
α1
Q− α2
α1
Y + λd
1
α1
Q− βd − γdR− τdQ. (A5)
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Solving for Q:
Q =
α1
(1 + λd)− α1τr p
u
+
α1
(1 + λd)− α1τr [
α0
α1
]
+
α1
(1 + λd)− α1τr [
α1Y
α2
]
− α1
(1 + λd)− α1τr [βd + γdR].
(A6)
At the equilibrium output after supply shocks, Q∗, shown in equation (A3), the equilib-
rium upstream firms’ output price can be expressed as follows by substituting equation (A3)
into equation (A5):
pu = β7 + β8Y + β9[βd + γdR] + β10[βu + γuW ] + β11X (A7)
where
β7 = β2,
β8 = β3,
β9 = β4,
β10 =
(1 + λd)− α1τd
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) , and
β11 =
τu[(1 + λd)− α1τd]
(1 + λd)(1 + λu)− α1(τu + τd) .
73
Table A.1: First Stage Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantity Quantity
VARIABLES Coef SE Coef SE
Personal Income 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003
Cereal Price -1.536** 0.754 -3.524*** 1.167
Juices Price 1.518* 0.798 3.562*** 0.919
Coffee-Tea Price 0.780 0.496 0.633 0.810
Cheese Price -0.804** 0.314 -0.185 0.568
Wage -1.020* 0.521 -1.083 0.899
Diesel 5.602* 2.897 8.801* 5.144
Electricity 3.231 6.985 -27.049*** 6.809
Feed -2.288 1.749 -5.711** 2.400
Labor 44.851 27.586 128.002*** 41.934
Energy -5.206* 2.901 -7.842 5.088
Month = 2 -35.982*** 3.031
Month = 3 -6.447** 2.986
Month = 4 -21.006*** 3.574
Month = 5 -16.091*** 3.865
Month = 6 -45.008*** 5.434
Month = 7 -37.430*** 6.447
Month = 8 -13.711** 6.175
Month = 9 -15.533*** 4.768
Month = 10 -1.535 3.432
Month = 11 -8.527** 3.349
Month = 12 -1.227 3.372
Quarter = 2 -1.728 4.614
Quarter = 3 11.401* 5.957
Quarter = 4 12.176*** 4.221
Constant 413.034*** 138.476 465.733** 197.109
Observations 120 120
R-squared 0.876 0.619
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
ELMHURST DAIRY 5.073 0.001 0.25 1% Carton
ELMHURST DAIRY 5.082 0.001 0.25 2% Carton
ELMHURST DAIRY 5.126 0.001 0.25 Fatfree Carton
ELMHURST DAIRY 5.021 0.001 0.25 Whole Carton
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.585 0.001 0.5 1% Plastic
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.570 0.002 0.5 2% Plastic
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.632 0.001 0.5 Fatfree Plastic
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.501 0.004 0.5 Whole Plastic
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.012 0.002 1 1% Plastic
ELMHURST DAIRY 3.985 0.002 1 2% Plastic
ELMHURST DAIRY 4.118 0.001 1 Fatfree Plastic
ELMHURST DAIRY 3.936 0.006 1 Whole Plastic
FARMLAND DAIRIES 5.608 0.002 0.5 2% Plastic
FARMLAND DAIRIES 5.619 0.003 0.5 Whole Plastic
FARMLAND DAIRIES 4.498 0.001 1 1% Plastic
FARMLAND DAIRIES 4.548 0.002 1 2% Plastic
FARMLAND DAIRIES 4.547 0.002 1 Whole Plastic
FARMLAND S.R. SKIM 9.833 0.002 0.25 Fatfree Carton
FARMLAND S.R. SKIM 7.433 0.015 0.5 Fatfree Carton
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FARMLAND S.R. SKIM 7.279 0.001 0.5 Fatfree Carton Y
FARMLAND 5.633 0.001 0.5 1% Plastic
FARMLAND 5.564 0.001 0.5 Fatfree Plastic
FARMLAND 4.444 0.001 1 Fatfree Plastic
GARELICK FARMS 4.092 0.000 1 2% Plastic
GARELICK FARMS 4.050 0.000 1 Whole Plastic
HOOD LACTAID 10.561 0.001 0.25 2% Carton Y
HOOD LACTAID 10.789 0.001 0.25 Fatfree Carton Y
HOOD LACTAID 8.989 0.003 0.5 1% Carton Y
HOOD LACTAID 8.827 0.004 0.5 2% Carton Y
HOOD LACTAID 9.001 0.004 0.5 Fatfree Carton Y
HOOD LACTAID 8.947 0.002 0.5 Whole Carton Y
HOOD LACTAID 7.996 0.002 0.75 1% Plastic Y
HOOD LACTAID 7.975 0.003 0.75 2% Plastic Y
HOOD LACTAID 8.199 0.004 0.75 Fatfree Plastic Y
HOOD LACTAID 8.011 0.003 0.75 Whole Plastic Y
HOOD SIMPLY SMART 7.328 0.001 0.5 Fatfree Carton
HORIZON ORGANIC 9.368 0.002 0.5 1% Carton Y
HORIZON ORGANIC 9.360 0.003 0.5 2% Carton Y
HORIZON ORGANIC 9.559 0.002 0.5 Fatfree Carton Y
HORIZON ORGANIC 9.455 0.003 0.5 Whole Carton Y
LEHIGH VALLEY 5.928 0.000 0.5 2% Plastic
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS 6.626 0.000 0.5 1% Carton
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS 6.558 0.000 0.5 2% Carton
MOUNTAINSIDE FARMS 6.501 0.000 0.5 Whole Carton
ORGANIC VALLEY 8.962 0.002 0.5 1% Carton Y
ORGANIC VALLEY 9.180 0.002 0.5 2% Carton Y
ORGANIC VALLEY 8.965 0.002 0.5 Fatfree Carton Y
ORGANIC VALLEY 8.995 0.002 0.5 Whole Carton Y
PRIVATE LABEL 6.124 0.001 0.25 1% Carton
PRIVATE LABEL 6.014 0.001 0.25 1% Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 6.111 0.002 0.25 2% Carton
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PRIVATE LABEL 6.033 0.002 0.25 2% Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 6.086 0.001 0.25 Fatfree Carton
PRIVATE LABEL 5.937 0.002 0.25 Fatfree Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 6.175 0.003 0.25 Whole Carton
PRIVATE LABEL 6.048 0.003 0.25 Whole Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 7.542 0.003 0.5 1% Carton Y
PRIVATE LABEL 4.987 0.015 0.5 1% Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 7.522 0.003 0.5 2% Carton Y
PRIVATE LABEL 4.967 0.019 0.5 2% Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 7.412 0.001 0.5 Fatfree Carton
PRIVATE LABEL 7.447 0.003 0.5 Fatfree Carton Y
PRIVATE LABEL 7.065 0.001 0.5 Fatfree Carton Y
PRIVATE LABEL 4.929 0.014 0.5 Fatfree Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 6.866 0.000 0.5 Whole Carton
PRIVATE LABEL 7.413 0.003 0.5 Whole Carton Y
PRIVATE LABEL 5.022 0.022 0.5 Whole Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 3.717 0.048 1 1% Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 6.090 0.001 1 1% Plastic Y
PRIVATE LABEL 3.790 0.068 1 2% Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 6.072 0.001 1 2% Plastic Y
PRIVATE LABEL 3.572 0.035 1 Fatfree Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 5.872 0.002 1 Fatfree Plastic Y
PRIVATE LABEL 3.833 0.067 1 Whole Plastic
PRIVATE LABEL 5.586 0.005 1 Whole Plastic Y
SMART BALANCE H.R. 7.096 0.001 0.5 Fatfree Carton
SMART BALANCE 7.160 0.002 0.5 Fatfree Carton
SMART BALANCE 7.229 0.002 0.5 Fatfree Carton Y
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 8.569 0.003 0.5 1% Carton Y
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 8.664 0.004 0.5 2% Carton Y
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 8.585 0.003 0.5 Fatfree Carton Y
STONYFIELD ORGANIC 8.744 0.004 0.5 Whole Carton Y
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS O.T.M 7.037 0.001 0.5 Fatfree Carton
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TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 6.674 0.001 0.25 1% Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 6.683 0.001 0.25 2% Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 6.602 0.001 0.25 Fatfree Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 6.655 0.002 0.25 Whole Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 5.370 0.005 0.5 1% Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 5.334 0.007 0.5 2% Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 5.379 0.005 0.5 Fatfree Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 5.295 0.009 0.5 Whole Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 4.125 0.008 1 1% Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 4.116 0.012 1 2% Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 4.137 0.006 1 Fatfree Plastic
TUSCAN DAIRY FARMS 4.077 0.014 1 Whole Plastic
TUSCAN TRUMOO 5.383 0.001 0.5 1% Plastic
TUSCAN TRUMOO 4.283 0.001 1 1% Plastic
WELSH FARMS 4.006 0.000 1 1% Plastic
WELSH FARMS 3.956 0.001 1 2% Plastic
WELSH FARMS 3.927 0.001 1 Whole Plastic
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